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Article Abstract
What Kinds of Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs
and “Ownership Societies”
Robert Hockett
Present-day advocates of an “ownership society” (OS) do not seem to have
noticed the means by which, since the 1930s and 1960s respectively, we have worked to
become an OS already where homes and “human capital” are concerned. Nor have
those advocates considered whether these same means – which amount to publicly
augmented private financial engineering – might be employed to spread shares in
business firms as widely as we have spread homes and higher educations.
This Article, the third in a trio of pieces devoted to fleshing out what a
contemporary OS consistent with American values, endowment psychology and legal
tradition would be, seeks to fill-in that gap. First it shows that there is indeed a gap to be
filled – that firm-owning remains nowhere near as widespread as home- and human
capital-owning. Next the Article shows that the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)
can be viewed as a tentative first step toward filling that gap. Indeed the ESOP, not
accidentally, partly replicates our home- and education-spreading programs – but does
so in what appears to be needlessly piecemeal, suboptimal fashion.
The ESOP is widely observed to concentrate income-risk, which an OS should
spread. Yet more importantly, this Article argues, the ESOP is needlessly unambitious:
It confines itself to labor patronage as the sole desert base upon which the reward that is
share-spreading is predicated, and to tax-break-assisted firm borrowing as the sole
credit base upon which leveraged financing is grounded. But there are many more forms
of patronage than labor, and many more bases of credit than share-issuing firms, that we
can exploit to complete an OS.
The Article accordingly generalizes from the ESOP along two salient dimensions
– the patronage and credit dimensions – in order to complete SOP-financing’s
replication of our federal home- and higher education-finance programs. It first
proposes a number of analogues to the ESOP grounded upon non-labor patronage forms,
then a “capital mortgage” financing program that is the full analogue to our present-day
methods of home- and higher education-finance.
Our fuller OS, the Article concludes, is a “three-legged stool” that awaits our
completing its third leg.
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INTRODUCTION: OUR THREE-LEGGED STOOL’S MISSING LEG
The phrase “ownership society” exerts a peculiar allure.1 Those who employ it
appear to be genuinely invoking, even promising, something. This “something” is not
quite distinct: It shimmers ahead, so to speak, as if over a desert horizon. Yet somehow
we’re sure nonetheless that it’s there and is wonderful, if we can but reach it. But what
stirring state is this that each of us yearns for and most of us lack, which all of us
fleetingly glimpse and might have if we’d seek it together? Is it anything more than a
mirage?
It seems to have something to do with freedom – with material freedom and
therefore with bounded, accountable freedom: “joint and several” freedom.2 We picture a
1

I do not say this as one who finds much allure in recent “tax relief” or “Social Security reform”
proposals sometimes associated with the phrase. (A conspicuous summation of such associating can be
found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html.)
2

I endeavor to trace the relations among freedom, “material freedom” and “bounded, accountable”
freedom in the first mentioned predecessor article. See Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which
Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005) (hereinafter “Whose Ownership?”). Briefly, “material freedom” is

2

coordinated array of mutually delimited personal autarkies and risk-independencies.
We’re drawn to this picture’s implicit promise – of ownership’s right of control over
some basic minimum that each of us needs and can live on productively. And we’re
drawn by its nod to a modest, contained self-sufficiency, its regard for the grace of “a
gracious plenty.” For we know that it’s fitting to leave “enough and as good” for our
fellows as that which we take, from the store of such resources as none of us has
produced.3 And we sense it is proper, to work all together to ensure that such allotments
– and the responsible freedom that they can secure – will ever be here to be had by us all.
It is a sustainable “society” of owners we picture, after all, not a fantasy island or
Robinson Crusoe world.4
Once, when nearly all we required could be had from the land, and there was
rather more land than we needed, we began to build such an “ownership society.”5 We
just spread the land, in graciously sized parcels, to all who by working could render it
freedom that is exercised through control over resources. That freedom is “bounded” and “accountable”
because all of us bear equal moral claims upon such resources as we have not ourselves created. I intend
“joint and several freedom” here to suggest a conceptual complement to joint and several liability – the idea
that we would each have it and all have it, the “amount” that each severally has being a straightforward
fraction of the total that jointly is shared.
3

The “enough and as good” qualification has come to be labeled “the Lockean proviso,”
stemming as it does from Locke’s Second Treatise of Government. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 288 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988). See also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
174-82 (1974) (coining the term “Lockean proviso” and offering a would-be Paretian “update” of the
proviso whereby appropriation of resources is deemed ethically permissible if those consequently excluded
from access to the appropriated resources are nonetheless rendered no worse off than they otherwise would
have been).
4

Perhaps it is something like James Meade’s “property owning democracy” that we are after, the
image of which figures briefly, before disappearing, in Rawls. See J. E. MEADE, EFFICIENCY, EQUALITY
AND THE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY (1964); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 242 (Rev’d ed., 1999). Or
perhaps it is something like that which was envisaged by Meade’s contemporary compatriots, the
“Distributist” contributors to early-20th Century Catholic social thought. See, e.g., HILAIRE BELLOC, THE
SERVILE STATE (1912); G. K. CHESTERTON, THE OUTLINE OF SANITY (1927).
5

This began with early American land policy, then “took off” in earnest during the early 1860s
with the Homestead and Land Grant Acts. I endeavor to trace and interpret these efforts in another
predecessor article, the sequel to that cited supra, note 2. See Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by
Hamiltonian Means, 79 SO. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005) (hereinafter “Hamiltonian Means”).
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productive and live on it. We spread the know-how required to do that as well: Some of
the land endowed free-access schools of “agricultural extension.” These resources – land
and land-grounded “human capital,” along with a few rudimentary implements and
mutual insurance arrangements – were all that we had to spread widely to realize a thenmodern, prosperous republic of owners. We called it “homesteading;” but really it was
high-yielding “farmsteading” and farm-grounded “schoolsteading.”6
Then the land ran out. And so did the land’s capacity, when spread in small
parcels, to satisfy our ever developing wants: It became no longer possible to give land
without taking land.7 And an agrarian “yeoman” republic could no longer be an opulent
or modern republic in any event. So we turned to another public resource apart from the
land, one that could seemingly be given without taking. We used public credit – “full
faith and credit.”8 We harnessed belief in a shared future, as embodied in a government
that we counted our agent, to spread homesteads’ homes and human capital – houses and
higher (no longer just agricultural) education. But we have not yet recovered

6

Not surprisingly, there is some disagreement over the degree to which the Homestead and Land
Grant Acts contributed to the spread of farms and the growth of agricultural productivity in the later 19th
Century. Compare, e.g., ALAN F. ZUNDEL, DECLARATIONS OF DEPENDENCY: THE CIVIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION IN U.S. POVERTY POLICY 23-42 (2000) to ROBERT DAHL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC
DEMOCRACY 71-72 (1985), and to Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 489 506-13 (2002). See generally Hockett, id. at 99-104. We need not, of course, attempt any final
adjudication here. It also bears noting, perhaps, that even were critics unambiguously correct, our tendency
to idealize the period would itself be revelatory of some “deep” feature of our desires and ideals.
7

Of course we took land for homesteading too. But sadly we took it from people we did not count
as rights-bearing people. On the political significance of public giving that does not appear to require
taking, please see Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 2, at 80-81.
8

And “faith,” “credit” as credere, are the words here. We served as ultimate guarantor. Hockett,
Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5 at 93.
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homesteads’ nonhuman capital.9 We have yet to find and spread a counterpart to that, an
analogue to the productive land itself. What is the analogue?
The analogue, I think, must be business capital – shares in firms.10 That is what
now plays the role parceled land and plows did. If the phrase “ownership society” is to
designate anything at all in our time – much less get off the ground, so to speak – we
must surely get serious about spreading shares in firms.11 But how to do that?
Simple taking and giving probably are not in the cards. Perhaps they never
were.12 But happily, it seems, they have never been needed. For did we not note just
above, that when the land finally ran out we began publicly spreading the private owning
of homes and “human capital” by other means? We collectively mobilized, guaranteed
and “securitized” individually (and productively) used credit.13 Might we not spread
firm-shares the same way? Indeed, in a way, that is what we do now, in modest and
piecemeal fashion. Or so we shall presently see.14 So perhaps we need only extend our
ambition.

9

Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5, at 95.

10

I find this thought hard to escape. If I am simply misguided I’ll be grateful to be put right.

11

The sense in and degree to which we have not yet been serious about such share-spreading is
discussed further infra, Part I.
12

But see supra note 7.

13

See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5, at 93.

14

See Part II, infra. This Article treats principally of ESOPs as present means. Another present –
and again piecemeal – means is the public encouragement of new and “small” business formation. I think
that these efforts are laudable, but not enough. Why I think ESOPs inadequate will emerge in this Article,
in particular at Part III. Why small business encouragement is inadequate I’ll treat of in a subsequent
Article. The short answer is that small business encouragement is analogous less to 19th Century landspreading than it is, say, to 16th Century exploration-financing. It is terribly important and much to be
praised, but also too speculative a public venture upon which entirely to ground a stable, sustainable
“ownership society.” It also bears noting that up to the present ownership stakes in non-publicly-traded
companies – sole proprietorships, partnerships of all kinds, subchapter S corporations and limited liability
companies – are concentrated among Americans situated in the top decile of income and wealth. See Brian

5

But now here’s the rub: We have avoided the appearance of “taking” and
“giving” in the home-spreading, school-spreading and piecemeal stock-spreading cases
by exploiting a fact that’s peculiar to those cases: The beneficiary must labor to pay
down the debt and make her investment pay off. Where it’s a home we have helped her
to purchase, she has toiled to pay down the mortgage and maintain the premises.15 That
secures the premises’ value, in order that they might appreciate even as the debt itself
amortizes. Where it’s education we’ve spread, our beneficiary has worked at her studies
and built up “human assets.”16 Then she has toiled at her job, which pays all the more in
virtue of the schooling itself, to pay down her loans. So value-additive toil and
remunerative employment have been key to our latterday ownership-spreading’s actuarial
and political successes. But then, what to do when the last thing to be spread – a share in
employing firms themselves – is itself counseled precisely because the employment is not
always there to be had?17
The Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), I suspect, offers a glimpse of our
answer, but is not itself our answer. It hints at our answer because, as in the homespreading and education-spreading cases, it employs the credit-augmenting strategy and
ties benefit to toil. And it spreads shares in firms – our hypothesized primary analogue to
homesteading’s land. But it is not our full answer also because it ties benefit to toil – to
toil that’s not always there to be had. And it concentrates risk: Beneficiaries derive
K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of
Consumer Finances, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, February, 2006, at A1, A24.
15

See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5, at 96.

16

See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5, at 153.

17

See infra, Part III. Also Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging, 25 U.
PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 107, 174-82 (2004) (hereinafter “Global Macro-Hedging”).
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capital and labor incomes from the same source. Is there some way to have what is good
here while avoiding what is not?
Yes. Or so I am tempted to think.18 The key, I suspect, is to fix on two facts:
First, that the ESOP rests more heavily upon single firms’ credit than on the public’s
much greater full faith and credit.19 Second, that employment is but one form of such
firm-patronage as can ethically warrant the reward that is ownership.20 So the ESOP is
piecemeal indeed as a business capital analogue to public-credit-fueled, private homeand education-spreading. If we step farther out along both aforementioned dimensions –
the credit and patronage dimensions – we might generalize the ESOP into a method of
business capital-spreading on par with our present-day home- and education-spreading.
Then our “ownership society” might again stand on three legs; it will be complete in the
way that it began to be when there was land enough and when land was enough.
Our plan in this Article, then, is as follows. Part I takes the measure, so to speak,
of our shortfall. The aim is to indicate how few Americans hold substantial, material
independence-conferring or participation-fostering stakes in firms. To show this up front
seems important in view of some evidently widespread perceptions, among certain well-

18

Again, I’ll be grateful to be shown wrong if I’m wrong. I do not wish to speak dogmatically or
with a false certainty here, and don’t wish to keep traveling a blind alley if that’s what I’m doing. It just
seems that this might be the right road – I see no potholes – particularly in view of our shortfall in
securities-spreading documented infra, Part I, the contrasting success of our home- and education-finance
programs summarized infra, Part V, and the ease with which one can dispatch the more obvious
anticipatable objections run-through infra, Part VI. In light of all of this it is tempting to think both that we
should spread more stock and that an analogue to our home- and education-spreading programs can be
fashioned for stock-spreading. But if I am wrong about the urgency of the need, or if the analogy to homeand education-spreading breaks down, I’ll be happy to be set straight.
19

I address the critical role of credit in SOP-financing infra, Parts II.A, III.D, and V.

20

For more on the apparent political need of this ethical warrant, please see Hockett, Whose
Ownership?, supra note 2, at 82. I discuss patronage and the ethical warrant that it appears to provide
infra, Parts II.C and IV.

7

to-do citizens and policy elites, that “most of us are stockholders already.”21 Learning the
truth of the matter at the outset will serve to underscore the compellingness of the need
we address in succeeding Parts.
Part II then rehearses the workings and successes of the leveraged ESOP – the
principal means, thus far, by which we have sought as a society to spread shares in
firms.22 The aim here is first to show, mechanically, how publicly augmented firm credit
actuarially underwrites employee share-acquisition, thereby augmenting nonowners’
purchasing power for such acquisition. The aim is second to indicate, now more
politically than mechanically, how employment as a salient form of firm patronage
appears ethically to underwrite the benefit that ESOPs confer upon acquiring employees.
The latter is important to show not only because the aforementioned benefit might
otherwise resemble a politically contestable “giving,” but because it entails an illdisguised “taking” as well: It dilutes the holdings of others who already own, yet is
nonetheless acquiesced-in – in large part because it is publicly subsidized, we shall see.
And patronage appears to explain public acquiescence in the subsidy.
Part III then turns to the deficiencies of ESOPs as share-spreading engines of a
completed American “ownership society.” These deficiencies are associated with the two
aforenoted “dimensions”– those of credit and patronage. The ESOP relies principally
upon firm credit as frontline guarantor of individual stock-purchasers’ credit. That both
(a) unduly limits individuals’ stock-purchasing credit, and (b) necessitates more

21

Please see first several footnotes to Part I, infra.

22

At least pre-retirement. See Parts I and II, infra, on the significance of this caveat. In brief, our
concern here is with building an “ownership society” that citizens might partake of over more than the final
ten years or so of their lives.

8

potentially objectionable dilution of existing shareholders and taxpayers than appears to
be socially necessary. The ESOP also relies solely upon the employment relation as
ultimate patronage form warranting benefit-conferral. That unduly limits the range of
stock-purchasing possibilities, and accordingly both exacerbates the dilution problem and
concentrates precisely that risk which a comprehensive “ownership society” should
diversify.23
Part IV initiates our two-front approach to discharging the task of generalizing the
ESOP along the two aforementioned “dimensions.” The aim is to sketch ESOP
analogues grounded in forms of patronage additional to the employment relation. So it
considers such schemes as “customer stock ownership plans” (CuSOPs), “resource” or
“rent-recouping stock ownership plans” (RentSOPs), and ultimately, perhaps, simple
“citizen stock ownership plans” (CitSOPs) and diversifying “meta stock ownership
plans” (MetaSOPs). In each case we consider the ways in which the form of patronage
upon which the benefit-conferral is grounded serves to render that conferral perceivedly
earned or deserved, hence better than a “handout” or “giving.” And in each case we
accordingly see why the “taking” – the dilution of existing owners – recedes as a
potential political problem.
Part V proceeds to the second “dimension,” that of credit. The aim here is to
indicate, mechanically, how we might generalize from the ESOP idea by using
beneficiary credit and the public’s full faith and credit, instead of just firms’ tax-breakassisted credit, to underwrite stock-acquisition by non-owning citizens. That is what we
have done in the cases of home-spreading and education-spreading, we’ll see; and there

23

Please see supra, note 15.

9

seems no reason in (financial) theory why we could not do the same in the case of stockspreading. There might, however, be somewhat more poignant, endowment-psychologyrooted political obstacles in this case. And so we shall find the patronage discussion of
Part IV helpful in conceiving conditions – “strings” – that might be attached, hence
afford public warrant, to the benefits conferred by any “Capital Mortgage Finance”
program.
Part VI addresses anticipated objections to the lines of inquiry and tentative
proposals set forth in Parts IV and V. Then I conclude and look forward.
I. THE MEASURE OF OUR SHORTFALL: PATTERNS OF SECURITIES-HOLDING IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
I hope that anyone who has read the present Article’s two companion pieces will
find the prospect of a completed “ownership society,” hence the prospect of publicly
facilitated stock-spreading, at least provisionally attractive. Provided that these are
indeed prospects rather than faits accompli, there are grounds for that hope. For it would
be difficult to examine, as related in the second of those companion pieces, the means by
which we have worked publicly to facilitate home-spreading and higher-educationspreading without marveling at two of those means’ features in particular: First, their
sheer financial ingenuity. Second, the ways in which their shared financial form both
respects and gives expression to core American values and endowment dispositions. And
while marveling so, one is naturally tempted to ask whether the same means might not be
adapted to stock-spreading, in a manner that might supply the missing leg to that “threelegged stool” which would constitute a completed American ownership society – a
society in which all participate in a responsible material freedom.

10

It might also be wondered, however – at least by some – whether the mentioned
“third leg” has not already been supplied. For there seems a tendency among at least
some well-to-do Americans to suppose that the U.S. already approximates to something
like an “equity culture” or, say, a “shareholder society:”24 Our securities markets are
deep and liquid. News outlets continuously report stock-index performances. Pop
investment advisors appear regularly on television and radio programs, as well as
maintaining websites, where they share investment strategies with presumably broad
audiences of share-holding viewers and listeners.25 Some of the same personages, along
with others, write books that sell widely.26 And all of it scarce wonder, we might
suppose: For we even are directly told, point blank, that “half of us own stock.”27 And
since many of the “other half” either are children or are retirees for whom bond- and
other asset-holding makes more risk-sense than would stock-holding, it might then seem

24

See, e.g., B. MARK SMITH, THE EQUITY CULTURE (2003); RANDY MARTIN, THE
FINANCIALIZATION OF DAILY LIFE (2002); PETER DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION
FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA (1976).
25

Consider, e.g., The Motley Fool, who regularly turn up on radio talkshows and maintain their
own website: http://www.fool.com/. Consider also Marketplace, the syndicated public radio program, who
also maintain a website: http://marketplace.publicradio.org/. And of course consider the venerable public
television programs Wall Street Week with Louis Rukeyser, then Louis Rukeyser’s Wall Street, which had
popular until Mr. Rukeyser’s departure from the first then recent retirement from the second; see Nat Ives,
“Wall Street Week,” A PBS Staple, Will Go Off the Air in June, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 2005, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/24/business/media/24pbs.html?ei=5088&en=b8340d014a2ac113&amp;e
x=1269320400&adxnnl=1&partner=rssnyt&adxnnlx=1111723761-jvUO6FRczqrLmeYg+YE/MQ.
26

See, e.g., DAVID GARDNER & TOM GARDNER, THE MOTLEY FOOL INVESTMENT GUIDE: HOW
THE FOOL BEATS WALL STREET’S WISE MEN AND HOW YOU CAN TOO (2001); BOB FROEHLICH & SUZE
ORMAN, WHERE THE MONEY IS: HOW TO SPOT KEY TRENDS AND MAKE INVESTMENT PROFITS (2001);
PETER LYNCH, BEATING THE STREET: HOW TO USE WHAT YOU ALREADY KNOW TO MAKE MONEY IN THE
MARKET (2000); JAMES K. GLASSMAN & KEVIN HASSETT, DOW 36,000: THE NEW STRATEGY FOR
PROFITING FROM THE COMING RISE IN THE STOCK MARKET (2000). This is truly a minimal sampling.
27

See, e.g., INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2002 15

(2002).
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natural to conclude, from the “half of us” figure, that firm-owning already is spread just
as optimally as are home-owning and higher-educated “human capital”-owning.
But that “natural” conclusion, it turns out, is false. And the observations just
related that might seem to warrant the conclusion are all, in potential, quite grossly
misleading. For it is one thing for many to own some stock. It would be quite another
for many to own significant amounts of stock. And it would be yet more to claim that
many owned large, independence-conferring and participation-fostering blocks of stock.
A tiny few, we shall see, own blocks like that. And few indeed own significant amounts
of stock, or of other financial assets with significant present value for that matter, at all.28
First I consider stock-holding irrespective of whether it be “direct,” “indirect” or
“beneficial.”29 Then I track ownership patterns under those classifications separately.30

28

I confine myself principally to stock-owning in this Article, setting other financial assets off to
the side. A brief explanation is in order: Were we interested in the owning of securities and other financial
assets primarily in view of the firm-participation and -governance rights that such owning might confer
(please see infra notes 30, 62, 142), it would be obvious why we should restrict our attention to equity
securities and ignore other forms of financial asset: only the former confer voting rights upon their bearers.
But I restrict attention to equities even while granting that an “ownership society” should be interested in
spreading securities and other assets on grounds additional to firm-participation and -governance grounds,
including income-independence grounds (again see infra notes 30, 62, 142). I do so for two reasons: First,
with the exception of one comparatively small class of Americans who are not our principal concern here,
most who own corporate equities at all own other kinds of financial asset to a much lesser (and indeed
more maldistributed) extent, meaning that holdings of the other kind do not substantially offset the shortfall
in stock-owning. Second, the aforementioned small exceptional class of Americans – those who are
wealthy, retired, or nearing retirement – principally comprises people who simply (and in the latter two
cases recently) have exchanged equities for less volatile securities in express recognition that they are
nearing the ends of their lives. See generally SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, 2005 SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK
66-67 (Grace Toto ed., 2005) (Median household holding liquid financial assets beyond cash holds 37% of
those assets in equities, 11 % in bonds). See also Bucks et al., supra note 14 at A1, A10-A19 (showing
distributions of household financial assets among bank accounts, bonds, stocks, life insurance and other
categories over 2001-2004, broken down by household income-quintile, which distributions are more
skewed even than those of equity securities).
29

The distinctions between categories will become plain as we proceed. Briefly, “direct” owning
is holding of title to securities in the firm that issues the securities. “Indirect” owning is the holding of title
to shares in a firm which itself in turn holds title to securities issued by the “indirectly” owned firm. And
“beneficial” owning is simply one’s legal beneficiary status in relation to a trust, managed by another (a
trustee, of course), which holds title to securities issued by the “beneficially” owned firm. More on the
significance of the distinctions, for our purposes, infra.
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A. Direct, Indirect & Beneficial Holding Combined
It is true that “most” or nearly most Americans – either directly, indirectly,
beneficially or in some combination of those forms – own at least “some” shares in firms.
According to the Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry Association,
that could be said of about 52.7 million American households representing some 84.3
million adults in 2002.31 And that amounted to nearly 52% of American households.32
But we must qualify these statistics in two important ways, one potentially troubling, the
other determinately so.
The potentially troubling qualification comes via the Federal Reserve’s most
recent triennial survey of American family finances, released about one week before the
time of this writing.33 According to the Fed’s figures, the statistics cited in the previous
paragraph turn out to represent the peak of a trend begun over ten years ago – a trend in
the direction of gradually growing percentages of households owning stock in one form
or another. This trend now has begun to reverse itself:34 Since 2002, it seems, “the
fraction of families holding any . . . stock [has fallen] 3.3 percentage points, to 48.6

30

My reason for this division of the discussion is rooted in the discussion of the predecessor
articles. Briefly, it is that ownership-spreading resonates with several American valuational traditions –
what I call, with I think little if any idiosyncrasy, the Civic Republican, Classical Liberal, and Pragmatic
Consequentialist traditions. All three traditions, and especially the first two, value the independence that
owning confers upon owners. But the first of the traditions also conspicuously values the manner of
responsible civic engagement – participation – that owning encourages. In respect of firm-owning,
accordingly, the Civic Republican strand of the American valuational tradition will favor direct owning
over indirect owning, and both of these over mere “beneficial” owning.
31

INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 26 AT 15.

32

LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2004/2005, 287 (2005).

33

See Bucks et al., supra note 14.

34

Id. at A19.
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percent, a level apparently last reached some time between the 1995 and 1998 surveys.”35
In this same period, moreover, “the overall median value of direct and indirect stock
holdings [has] dropped 33.8 percent.”36 So we must not conclude from all of the rosy late
1990s chatter encountered in the popular media even that “half” of us own shares in firms
any longer, particularly if present apparent trends continue. For purposes of this Article,
however, I shall by and large ignore the more recent bad news. For what seems rather
more important is that even in that peak year for the widespreadness of stock-owning in
the U.S., we were very far from constituting anything like a meaningful “equity culture:”
So much for the potentially troubling qualification to the “half of us own stock”
statistic. The determinately troubling – and much more significant – qualification is this:
Even a moderately careful perusal of available data reveals that we have never, as yet,
come anywhere near to constituting a meaningful “ownership society” where firm-shares
are concerned. For, irrespective of the (only marginally) varying percentage of
Americans who have owned “some” stock since data on this question has been available,
the total distribution of stocks, tracked share by share, has never yet failed to be highly
skewed.37 It has been substantially more so, in fact, even than that of most other assets,
such as homes.38 It has also been substantially more so than that of (non-dividend)
income, long widely observed to be highly concentrated in the U.S. as compared to other

35

Id. at A19.

36

Id. at A19.

37

See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai et al., Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership
Concentration 34-36, Tables 1and 2 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 11469, June
2005). Also data recorded in remainder of this Part.
38

MISHEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 286. Also Bucks et al., supra note 14, at A22.
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jurisdictions.39 And these facts hold true even when we take direct, indirect and
beneficial securities-holding all into account. “Let’s do the numbers:” A few figures and
graphics prove telling:40
In 2001, the top 0.5% of stock-owning households in the United States held
25.6% of all shares.41 The bottom 80% held only 10.7%.42 The distribution,
unsurprisingly, remains quite concentrated at the top end when tracked by dollar value;
and the dollar value of most Americans’ holdings, when they hold anything, is
remarkably low: In 2001, the top 1% (in net worth terms) of households in America who
owned any stock at all had on average $3,568,40043 invested either directly, indirectly or
beneficially in stocks.44 The comparable figure for the next 9% of stock-owning
households was $512,300.45 For the next 10% it was $131,000.46 For the next 20% it

39

See, e.g., Desai et al., supra note 37, at 34-36, Tables 1and 2. (Over years 1929-2000, top
centile of Americans receive about 13.15% of non-dividend income on average, yet receive dividend
income ranging from 30-64% of all such reported, averaging near 50%.)
40

Listeners to Marketplace, cited supra note 25, will recognize this “doing the numbers” line.

41

MISHEL ET AL., supra note 31 at 287.

42

Id. From 1929-2000, the bottom 80% held closer to 22%, meaning that are doing worse than we
have done on average since the Great Crash. See Desai et al., supra note 32 at 36, Table 2. Desai et al.
reveal another interesting result – viz., that corporate ownership concentration systematically reversecorrelates with tax progressivity, as originally postulated first by Means, then by Berle and Means. See
Desai et al., op. cit. at 1 passim (“highly progressive income taxes . . . associated with . . . sharp increase in
the diffusion of ownership”). See also Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United
States, 44 Q. J. ECON. 561 (1930); ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). The tax-cutting strand of the ideology of some ownership society
advocates, it seems, is at crossed purposes with the “ownership society” strand.
43

All monetary figures are calculated in constant 1995 dollars.

44

MISHEL ET AL., supra note 31 at 289.

45

Id. at 289.

46

Id. at 289.
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was $41,300.47 The middle 20% had $12,000 on average invested either directly,
indirectly or beneficially.48 And the bottom 40% of stock-owning households had a mere
$1,800.49 (We are still ignoring, recall, the roughly half of Americans who hold no
equity securities in any manner.) While “the average” stock-owning American
household, then, had $106,000 invested in stock either directly, indirectly or
beneficially,50 it would be illicit to suppose that a significant number of American
households held portfolios with anything near that value in view of the distribution just
catalogued.
Graph 1 makes the point pictorially. It illustrates the total distribution of stock
holdings by stock-holding American wealth class in 2001.51 Perhaps the most starkly
striking fact visible here is that, while the wealthiest 10% of American households
owning any stock at all – those represented by the first two columns – directly, indirectly
or beneficially held approximately 76.9% of all stocks, the least wealthy 40% – those
represented by the last column alone – held (in the same manners) only about 0.7%:52

47

Id. at 289.

48

Id. at 289.

49

Id. at 289.

50

Id. at 289.

51

What I mean by “wealth class” will be apparent from the breakdown of the graph. I mean, in
net worth terms, the top one percent, the next nine percent, the next twenty percent, the next twenty percent
below that, then the bottom 40 percent.
52

Id. at 290.
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Graph 1: Securities Holdings Tracked by Top 1%, 9%, 10%, 20%, Middle 20% and
Bottom 40% American Stock-Holding Wealth Classes, 2001
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If we divide classes up evenly, say into quintiles, then the skew in our distribution
becomes both more transparent and more dramatic: The first three vertical bars in Graph
1 have to be stacked into one bar, while the last bar has to be subdivided into two yet
shorter bars. Things then look like this:
Graph 2: Securities Holdings Tracked by Stock-Holding American Household
Wealth Quintile, 2001
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That’s pretty telling. But we can say more: In 2002, nearly half of all equity investors
(and remember again that this class itself comprises but half of Americans generally) held
equity assets valued at less than $50,000.53 Over half of these in turn held assets valued

53

INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 26, at 6. Each of the following several
percentages (apart from the first – the 14% figure) should of course be divided approximately in half in
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at less than $25,000.54 Over half of those held assets valued at less than $10,000.55 And
only 7% held equity assets valued at $500,000 or more.56 Table 1 provides a fuller and
more detailed breakdown. It shows what percentage of equity investors (again, a
universe comprising but half of Americans in the first place) owned stock portfolios from
$0 to $1,000,000 or more, tracked by $10,000, then $15,000, then $25,000 and finally yet
larger increments, in 2002. 57
Table 1: Distribution of Equity Portfolios Tracked by Increments
Less than $10,000

14%

$10,000 - $24,999

11%

$25,000 - $49,999

24%

$50,000 - $74,999

15%

$75,000 - $99,999

7%

$100,000 - $249,999

15%

$250,000 - $499,999

7%

order to calculate what percentage of the population at large holds portfolios of the associated values. (If
we include a “null portfolio” for those holding no securities at all, we should add 50% to the 14% figure, to
reflect the fact that 64% of Americans hold either no stock at all or stock valued at less than $10,000.) I
trust that the average scholarly reader will appreciate how truly small is the value of even that $50,000
portfolio which 75% of Americans do not have.
54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 6. The growing increments simply reflect the dramatic nature of the skew found in Graphs
1 and 2; the table would grow very long indeed were it to remain with $10,000 increments, and by far most
of the length would of course be represented by a tiny fraction of Americans – the very wealthy ones. Also
please note again that things have not improved on the score that I am tracking here, according to the Fed’s
latest data: Indeed they appear in most respects to have worsened. See Bucks et al., supra note 14, at A10A19.

20

$500,000 - $999,999

4%

$1,000,000 or more

3%

mean

$171,000

median

$50,000

B. Direct versus Indirect & Beneficial Holding
The distribution of undifferentiated stockholding as just portrayed should give
pause to those who believe that the U.S. constitutes an “equity culture” already.58 But
things become yet more problematic when we differentiate stockholding with a view to
whether the U.S. constitutes a literal “firm-ownership society.”59 For we can usefully
distinguish, for some purposes, among the direct, indirect and “beneficial” owning of
securities.60 To the degree that we are interested in securities-holding solely in virtue of
its capacity to confer a degree of income-independence upon the holder, the distinction
(like that between equities and other financial or readily liquidated assets61) is
presumably without difference. To the degree that we might be interested in securitiesholding in virtue of the habits of responsible owning and shared governance that it might
engender, however, the distinction will take on importance.62 (So, of course, will that

58

By “undifferentiated” I mean simply those who hold any stock at all, whether directly, indirectly
or beneficially. See supra, note 28, on the distinctions among those three classifications.
59

Taking ownership now to include, as it is typically defined to include, rights to control such as
we expect to accompany rights to residual earnings.
60

See supra, note 28, on the distinctions among these classifications.

61

See supra note 27.

62

Adherents to the Civic Republican tradition of American political thought, for example, might
take interest in securities holding for this reason. See note 28, supra, and note 142, infra. See also Gregory
S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 111 (1993). See generally
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between equity-holding and other forms of financial-asset-holding in this
circumstance.63) People with the latter interest – call them “Civic Republicans,” as
distinguished from “Classical Liberals” and “Pragmatic Consequentialists”64 – are likely
both to think of “owning” in “controlling” or “governing” terms, and in consequence to
find present patterns of American securities holding yet more dispiriting even than they
have appeared up to now in this Part.
The direct owning of firm-shares by American households is particularly rare.65
In 2001, only 21.3% of American households directly held any stock at all.66 By
contrast, 47.7% of households indirectly or beneficially held at least some stock (subject
to the distribution patterns just discussed above at Part I.A).67 Most households that
owned stock directly also owned stock indirectly or beneficially - 80.3% of them, in
fact.68 Only 17.1% of all American households held stock both directly and indirectly.69

ELLERMAN, infra note 114; and William H. Simon, Social Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335
(1991).
63

Absent proximity to “the vicinity of insolvency” on the part of the firm, of course, debt-holding
does not typically confer control rights or fiduciary rights upon the holder. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *109 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1991). See generally Henry Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA
L. REV. 277 (1990).
64

I take the terms from Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 2 at 5-28, where I employ them
to designate what I identify as the three dominant traditions of American political self-understanding, then
endeavor to identify a range of overlapping consensus among those traditions with a view to forging a
unitary ideological template upon which to construct a politically stable “ownership society.” See also
notes 28 and 62, supra, and note 142, infra.
65

I ignore here the owning of nonpublic firms. See notes 14 and 27, supra. It happens that the
owning of nonpublic firms is rare too, as a statistical matter. See Bucks et al., supra note 27, at A22. Yet
even were this not so, more owning of public firms, even by owners of nonpublic firms, would be
counseled by the diversification considerations discussed infra, Part III.
66

MISHEL ET AL., supra note 31 at 288.

67

Id. at 288. Please bear in mind the distribution described in the previous subpart supra, Part I.A.

68

Id. at 288.
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Much indirect holding of securities by Americans is effected through investment
companies, typically mutual funds. American investors on average hold much more
stock (indirectly) in mutual funds than (directly) in non-investment-company issuers:
Fully 89% of undifferentiated equity investors (again, that’s only half of Americans
generally) owned stock in mutual funds in 2002, while 49% owned non-investmentcompany issuing firms’ shares directly.70 Fully 51.5% of American equity investors held
only mutual fund shares.71 Eleven percent held only individual stock.72 And 37.5% of
held both individual stock and mutual fund stock.73
Another principal vehicle through which indirect securities-holding is effected is
the retirement or pension plan. Indeed, this seems to be the most significant form of
Americans’ indirect holding or “beneficial owning” of stock, in terms of sheer numbers
of “owners.”74 About 33.2 million Americans held (or beneficially owned) stock through
some employer plan in January, 2002.75 The comparable number for holding through
mutual funds was somewhat smaller: Only 28.7 million Americans held stock indirectly
though mutual funds outside of employer plans in 2002.76

69

Id. at 288.

70

INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, supra note 26, at 4.

71

Id. at 5.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Indeed sufficiently significant to have prompted Peter Drucker somewhat hyperbolically to refer
to an “unseen revolution” through which “pension fund socialism” had come to America. See DRUCKER,
supra note 24.
75

Id. at 4.

76

Id. at 4.
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Percentage-wise, nearly half of indirect stock-owning (or beneficial owning)
appears to be effected through employer plans: About 48% of American households
owning equities at all in 2002 initially acquired their stocks indirectly through employer
plans.77 About 44% initially purchased stock outside of these plans, and 8% initially
acquired stock both inside and outside of employer plans in the same year.78 The
majority of all American equity investors (again, not of all Americans) held at least some
stock through employer plans in 2002 – 66% – while only 17% held some stock directly
as well as through an employer plan.79
The significant role played by employer plans in indirect or beneficial stockholding by Americans raises more than just the governance concerns that might trouble
Civic Republicans. It also raises risk and diversification concerns that might trouble
anyone caring about the reliability of incomes – concerns we shall revisit in detail at Part
III below. Of the 8.8 million households, representing 12.3 million adult individuals,
who held or beneficially owned stock through employee plans in 2002, about 51%
“owned” only employer stock through their plans.80 Only about 28% owned only nonemployer stock.81 And only about 21% owned both employer and non-employer stock
through their plans.82 Fully 65% of investors holding individual stock through employer
plans in 2002 held only one or two separate stocks through such plans; only 16% owned
77

Id. at 4.

78

Id. at 4.

79

Id. at 4.

80

Id. at 65. The scare quotes round “owned” owe to the lack of control rights attaching to
“beneficial owning.” See note 70, supra.
81

Id. at 65.

82

Id. at 65.
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6 stocks or more.83 The median number of stocks held was one; the mean was four.84
(The median number of years that this group owned stock through employer plans was 10
years.85)
Apart from governance and risk-concentration concerns, it bears noting that
stock-holding through employee plans, though it represents a very large portion of all
American equities-owning, nonetheless is quite small when calculated in person-byperson terms: The median value of investors’ individual stock portfolios held through
employer plans was $25,000 in 2002, as compared to $30,000 in 1999.86 The mean value
of such portfolios was $150,000 in 2002, as compared to $105,000 in 1999.87 Among
investors holding only employer stock through their employer plans, the median value of
such “portfolios” was $17,500 in 2002; the mean value was $86,700.88 The median value
of investors' stock mutual fund portfolios held through employer plans was $30,000,

83

Id. at 70.

84

Id. at 70. It is perhaps worth noting that a want of diversity also afflicts the direct owning of
stock by most Americans who own in this way. According to the Fed, of those households that owned
stock directly at all in 2004, 34.6% held the stock in but one firm, 59.5% held the stock in three or fewer
firms, and only 9.5% held the stock in fifteen or more firms. Moreover, for 37.1% of these direct holders,
at least one of the firms in which shares were directly owned either employed or had employed either the
head of the household or that person’s spouse or partner. See Bucks et al., supra note 14, at A15.
85

Id. at 70.

86

Id at 71.

87

Id. at 71.

88

Id at 71. The scare-quotes around “portfolios” are meant to convey that a portfolio that includes
but one firm’s securities is a degenerate case.
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which typically was invested in three mutual funds.89 The mean value of these portfolios
was $84,100.90
We could proliferate figures like this ad libitum,.91 But there seems little need.
The point should by this point be plain: Negligibly few Americans directly, indirectly or
beneficially own sufficient securities as to be income-secure before reaching retirement.92
Not many more hold sufficient securities to be income-secure even upon retirement,
absent significant public assistance in the form of post-retirement income-support
through Social Security and Medicare.93 And far, far fewer hold equities directly in such
manner as to afford opportunities to participate meaningfully in the governance of firms.
In sum, then, we simply are nowhere near, in the realm of firm-owning, where we
are in the realm of home-owning or remunerative “human capital” owning.94 And even
in the latter, of course, there is more to be done.95 If we are to be truly serious about

89

Id at 88.

90

Id. at 88. For those who worry over the degree to which what stock-owning there is in America
is either indirect or beneficial in nature, additional worry might be occasioned by such “beneficial indirect”
owning as is noted here. On the other hand, the greater mean and median values of such portfolios,
presumably stemming from their diversification advantages, should afford some solace. There is of course
some inherent tension between the goals of income security and governance, just as “exit” and “voice,”
risk-avoidance and commitment generally represent alternatives rather than partners.
91

See, e.g., Bucks et al., supra note 14, where much more in the way of statistics along these lines
can be found. This, recall, is the recently released Fed report.
92

Consider again the dollar figures assayed above at Subpart I.A, in particular the $50,000 one.
See also notes 27 and 52, supra.
93

Consider the same figures just noted, at note 83, once again.

94

See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5 at 116-17, 153 on how much more widely
distributed these assets are now, after the implementation of federal credit-augmenting strategies of the
kind described infra, Part V, than they were prior to federal involvement. The present Article is of course
predicated in part on the prospect that the same basic strategy might be employed to similar effect in
spreading firm-shares.
95

See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 293. See also Robert Hockett, Asset-Spreading Among the
Poor: Past Efforts, Usable Lessons and Future Prospects (working draft, on file with author).
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becoming an “ownership society,” then – a society of responsible, participating and
materially autonomous owner-citizens rather than just a society in which some people
own some things – we shall have to become more serious about firm-ownershipspreading than we have thus far managed. We shall have, perhaps, to do with shares
something like what we have done with homes and higher educations.
II. A MODEST FIRST STEP TOWARD REDRESS: ESOPS – WHAT THEY DO, HOW
THEY DO IT & WHY WE SEEM TO LIKE THEM
It happens that we have as a society made some tentative effort toward firmownership-spreading. The principal means up to now has been the public favoring –
mainly the tax-favoring, we’ll see – of employee benefit plans under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA.96 Yet the ultimate aim here, as ERISA’s full
title suggests, has been mainly to encourage – and protect – investment for one limited
purpose – retirement security.97 There is one partial exception, however: The employee
stock ownership plan, or ESOP, was originally designed, and continues to be advocated,
at least partly as a means by which to foster the pre-retirement owning of firms by
employees. We shall see in the next Part the senses in which that is an over-modest aim.
This Part is concerned more with how the aim is effected, and why we seem willing to
effect it as we do. For the mechanics and politics here appear generalizable, in ways that
96

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified at 29 USCS § 1001 et seq.
(sections hereinafter cited by ERISA section number). See also DRUCKER, supra note 24; and LANGBEIN &
WOLK, infra note 97. I ignore here such proposals as that to diminish or even eliminate capital gains
taxation. Such proposals appear to be aimed at – and doubtless would have the effect of – more rewarding
of those who already own than fostering wider ownership.
97

Congressional action culminating in the passage of ERISA was precipitated by the folding of
the Studebaker corporation, which, it was subsequently discovered during bankruptcy proceedings, had
grossly underfunded, and indeed “raided,” its employee pension fund, leaving the suddenly unemployed
pensioners doubly bereft. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 68-84 (3rd ed., 2000). Those familiar with recent bankruptcies, particularly in the airline industry,
might be tempted to say plus ça change.

27

might benefit all Americans. And I plan to exploit that generalizability in Parts IV and V
in the interest of completing our “ownership society.”
A preliminary terminological point before we proceed: In speaking of ESOPs (or
“plans”), one can be speaking of any of several distinct, cognate kinds of financial
arrangement.98 All, as befits their shared name and as intimated above, are meant to
facilitate laborers’ acquisition of shares in the firms for which they work.99 By far the
most common such set of arrangements, however, and the one that will engage us here, is
the “leveraged” ESOP.100 This, as the qualifier suggests, is the plan that employs credit
in the share-acquiring process.101
A. What: Simple Mechanics and Spread
Here is what the leveraged ESOP does102: The employing firm adopts an ESOP
as a sponsored ERISA plan – a defined contribution plan.103 Like other ERISA plans, the

98

See JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 64-84 (1988) for a brief
cataloguing of ESOP types.
99

Id.

100

Id.

101
The principal non-credit-employing ESOPs – so-called “nonleveraged ESOPs,” “tax-credit
ESOPs (aka “TRASOPs”) and “payroll ESOPs” (aka “PAYSOPs”) – are briefly elaborated in BLASI, id.
102

The transactions which follow are related, in slightly differing order and somewhat less detail,
in EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 121-22
(3d ed. 1987).
103

ERISA § 407(d)(6). Defined contribution, or “DC” plans are to be distinguished from socalled “defined benefit” or “DB” plans. The former prescribe a schedule of payments made into an account
for the benefit of the employee, who in turn bears both “upside” gains and “downside” losses realized by
her investment portfolio over time. DB plans, by contrast, prescribe payments made out to the employee
upon her retiring, and the employing firm – or the insurance company from whom the firm purchases
annuities on behalf of its employee beneficiaries – in effect bears the aforementioned upside gains and
downside losses realized by the fund out of which payments are made.
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ESOP takes the legal form of a trust.104 It is a distinct, even if firm-sponsored and
ultimately board-directed, entity formed to acquire and hold stock on behalf of
employees. Its administrator, though named and directed by the sponsoring firm’s board
or a committee named thereby,105 accordingly bears fiduciary obligations to those
employees.106
Now partly in exchange for a promissory note, the trust borrows funds from a
bank or some other commercial lender.107 It uses those funds to purchase stock issued by
the sponsoring/employing firm at fair market value.108 The loan proceeds accordingly
pass through the ESOP to the sponsoring/employing firm itself – they finance it, we’ll see
– and the stock is then held in trust on behalf of the employees. The firm guarantees
repayment of the loan by the ESOP to the lender, and the stock held in the ESOP is itself
pledged as security.
Now over time, the sponsoring/employing firm makes cash contributions to the
ESOP, just as it would do in connection with any defined contribution plan. In this case
the contributions are used by the ESOP to amortize the loan originally used to purchase
104

ERISA §§ 404(a)(1), 403(a). The idea, of course, is both to insulate funds earmarked for
employees from the other financial operations of the firm, and to afford the employee beneficiaries the
benefit of fiduciary obligations owed them by the plan’s trustee. It is regrettably not clear, however, that
the trust protections offered employees by pension trusts are as fulsome as those offered beneficiaries of
other trusts. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that ERISA
defines “fiduciaries,” “fiduciary functions” and “fiduciary duties” more narrowly than does common law
trust doctrine). See also note 87, supra.
105

ERISA § 403(a)(1). A partial exception, which need not here detain us, is found at ERISA §

403(a)(2).
106

ERISA § 404(a)(1).

107

I say “partly” for reasons that will be made plain over the next several sentences.

108

Because the shares are purchased at fair market value, the purchase is sometimes misleadingly
described by ESOP-proponents as an equity-injection. We’ll see that what actually happens is publicly
subsidized debt finance accompanied by a stock giveaway.
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the sponsoring/employing firm’s shares.109 As the loan is paid down, stock held by the
trust is gradually released from its loan-securing role, to individual accounts maintained
severally on behalf of the employee/beneficiaries.110 It is released to those accounts in
proportions that track the beneficiaries’ labor-patronage of the firm (their wages or
salaries). Diagramatically:
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So the sponsoring/employing firm is, in effect, both borrowing and paying back on behalf of
employees for the purchase of its own stock – it gives out partial ownership of itself as an employee
benefit. There’s the dilution (of previous owners), more on which presently.
110

Typically the shares become saleable or redeemable only upon retirement or exit of the firm,
and typically the firm buys them back. There are voting restrictions (even to the vanishing point) as well,
as we’ll see presently. That is all significant when it comes to the question of just what “owning” should
mean here; but this isn’t our question in this Article. See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 2, for
more on that question. See also note 143, infra.
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Figure 1: Institutional/Financial Structure of a Leveraged ESOP
Arrangement
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Now not surprisingly, in view of the arrangement’s financial structure,111 this all
turns out to work rather well as a method of getting more “capital” to “labor” (and this is
not yet to mention: more debt financing to the firm). Some statistics are again telling:
By 1986, twelve years after ESOPs had attained congressional endorsement in ERISA,
nearly five thousand firms had adopted plans.112 About twenty-five percent of those
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With one possible – though minimal – caveat to be noted below, the employee/beneficiaries
neither pay nor pledge anything. The firm, in effect, does it all. Or nearly all, as we’ll see when we turn to
the government’s role.
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See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 105 (1996).
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plans held more than twenty-five percent of the outstanding stock of their firms, and
nearly two percent of them owned all such stock.113 By 1990, over twelve million
laborers – about 10% of the workforce – in over ten thousand firms had come to
participate in ESOPs.114
By the late 1990s, ESOPs were estimated to account for just under four percent of
corporate equity-holding in the United States.115 The rate of ESOP growth, moreover, by
this point had come to average between three- and six-hundred new plans per year,
accounting for between three- and six-hundred-thousand new employee participants per
year.116 Among sponsoring firms over the past thirty years have been such American
stalwarts as Avis, the Chicago Tribune, Delta, Federal Express, General Motors, Kraft,
Maytag, Polaroid, Procter & Gamble, Quaker Oats, United Airlines and Xerox.117 Even
skeptics of ESOPs, and of the oft-seemingly “crackpot” financial pronouncements of the
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Id.
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See, e.g., HANSMANN, supra note 112 at 105; UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 10-11,
20 (Corey Rosen & Karen M. Young eds., 1991); THE EXPANDING ROLE OF ESOPS IN PUBLIC COMPANIES
23-27 (Karen M. Young ed., 1990); DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKER-OWNED FIRM 110
(1990). ESOP-like structures have made significant headway in non-US jurisdictions as well. See Rosen
& Young, op. cit., and ELLERMAN, op. cit. A helpful catalogue of the one thousand largest firms with more
than four percent employee ownership is found in JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI & DOUGLAS LYNN KRUSE, THE
NEW OWNERS 257-301 (1991). The catalogue does not disaggregate employee ownership by ESOP, profitsharing, 401(k) and option plans, but is nonetheless suggestive in light both of (a) ESOPs’ accounting for
just shy of half of employee-owned equity, and (b) the surprising number of firms on the list that are twenty
or more percent employee-owned.
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See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, STATISTICAL PROFILE OF EMPLOYEE
OWNERSHIP (1997). The Center estimates that nine percent of equity is employee-owned, with profitsharing, 401(k) and stock option plans accounting for the non-ESOP balance. It should be noted that about
four percent of ESOPs are estimated to be terminated each year. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE
OWNERSHIP, op. cit.
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Rosen & Young, supra note 114; Young, supra note 114.
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ESOP’s inventor, Louis Kelso,118 readily acknowledge their “rapid proliferation,”119
hence that “[s]omething is happening that requires attention.”120 But what is it that is
happening, and why might it require attention? What do the telling statistics actually
tell?
ESOP promoters have tended to speak of ESOPs’ successes as though all were a
“natural” function of superior financial engineering, the “self-liquidation” of “capital
mortgages,” and the incentive effects that growing ownership imparts to laborers. Thus
Louis Kelso: “[T]he corporation and its employees can achieve [through ESOPfinancing] several hundred percent greater efficiency in the use of corporate earnings for
capital purposes than through conventional . . . financing.”121 And Kelsonian acolyte
Stuart Speiser: “Th[e] new capital . . . pay[s] for itself out of the increased profits
flowing from expanded production.”122 And the ever-reliably perky business journal,
Inc.: “[T]here’s considerable evidence that eliminating the employee mentality and
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Kelso routinely announced such putative discoveries as that “Say’s Law” is being “violated” in
modern capitalist economies, that contemporary economists remain wedded to the labor theory of value,
and that there are “two factors” that enter into production – capital and labor – with the first of those
accounting for an ever-growing share of value-added. See generally Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra
note 5, at 124-42. Economists do not appear to have found these discoveries compelling. I should perhaps
not be as “snarky” as I might here seem, however. Kelso’s motives, energy and inventiveness, as
distinguished from his sallies into theory, were nothing if not worthy of praise. And he was a lawyer and
investment banker, not an academic theorist, typically pitching his advocacy to legislators and the general
public rather than fellow-theorists. See generally Speiser, infra note 122.
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HANSMANN, supra note 112 at 105.
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ELLERMAN, supra note 114 at 120, emphasis omitted.
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LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER 62 (1986).
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STUART SPEISER, A PIECE OF THE ACTION 429 (1985), emphasis supplied. See infra note 246
for more on this “pays for itself” locution.
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creating companies of businesspeople, of owners, has become a kind of Hidden Secret of
Success in the American marketplace.”123
But in fact the mentioned evidence is hardly “considerable”: At best it is thin and
ambiguous.124 Nor does presently leverage-bought ESOP capital “pay for itself” in much
more than a trivial sense: It is far from clear that the dividend streams and/or capital
gains that attend ESOP stock would dependably pay off the term loans without help of
the kind we shall presently describe. And the “several hundred percent greater
efficiency,” which quantity incidentally is, like many Kelsonian magnitudes, arrived at by
altogether unspecified means, is hardly “natural,” “economic” or “financial” in any prelegal or pre-political senses of the terms. For the real “Hidden Secret of [EOPS’]
Success,” it turns out, is no more obscure than the tax code, ERISA, and combined
corporate governance and takeover law: The leveraged ESOP as currently constituted is
essentially a public benefit conferred through private channels.
B. How: Private Channels, Public Benefits
Consider first a few tax and ERISA advantages. These, working in tandem,
presently account both for the aforenoted “greater efficiency” of ESOPs as financing
tools, and for ESOP stock’s apparent capacity to “pay for itself.” They also “incentivize”
the lenders themselves, as well as non-ESOP shareholders from whom an ESOP might
seek shares:
1. Tax Advantages
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John Case, A Company of Business People, INC., April, 1993, at 79.
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See BLASI, supra note 98, at 25-27, 221-38 (1988) for plenary – and not unsympathetic –
discussion of what evidence there is.
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Probably the most efficacious tax advantage that leveraged ESOPs uniquely
confer upon sponsoring/employing/issuing firms comes via the Revenue Code’s
permitting them to deduct contributions made to their plans. The firm may deduct those,
to an amount up to twenty-five percent of all compensation paid a plan’s participants,
from its taxable income.125 That advantage works jointly with ERISA’s relaxing, in the
case of ESOPs, the now customary mandatory-diversification understanding of the
“prudent investor” standard to which employee pension trusts ordinarily are subject: In
non-ESOP cases, of course, ERISA requires that employee trusts be broadly invested; a
plan will not typically be permitted to hold very much of the sponsoring firm’s equity.126
But ESOPs are exempted from this standard,127 meaning that the firm that sponsors a
leveraged ESOP can both take the cake and keep the penny: It enjoys the tax favor
bestowed upon contributions to its plans, by further financing itself through new share
issuance.
Now the aforementioned “further financing” – the “purchase” of newly issued
shares by the legally distinct trust for the employees – as noted, is “leveraged.” But that
simply means that the firm is effectively financing itself with debt while enjoying a
publicly afforded tax break in doing so, in return for affording employees new stock.
And, as it happens, the lender supplying the “leverage” for ESOPs is tax-favored too:
125

IRC § 404. ESOPs enjoy other tax advantages enjoyed by employee pensions more generally,
most of which are noted below, but our focus will nevertheless be primarily upon what is unique to ESOPs.
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ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).
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ERISA § 404(a)(2). At least that is ordinarily the case. Courts have in some instances agreed
with the Department of Labor that there can be circumstances in which the prudent investor standard would
require the ESOP trustee to refrain from purchasing employer stock. See, e.g., Herman v. NationsBank
Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1997); Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995); Kuper v.
Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995). It should also be pointed out that any other assets in which the
ESOP might invest remain subject to the general diversification requirement. ERISA § 404(a)(1).
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Ordinarily, its taxable income is the interest received on lent funds.128 But on a loan to a
leveraged ESOP, fifty percent of that interest historically has been excluded.129 So in
effect, the legislated favors conferred upon ESOPs amount to significantly governmentsubsidized debt- financing of ESOP-sponsoring firms, in a manner intended to encourage
those firms to make partial firm-owners of firm-employees.
But wait, there’s more: Ordinarily, dividends paid out to the holders of firms’
shares are drawn from firms’ after-tax incomes.130 Dividends paid on the stock held in an
ESOP, however, are deductible from taxable corporate income.131 Capital gains reaped
by the trust also go untaxed; they’re deferred compensation.132 The tax code also affords
incentives to non-ESOP shareholders to transfer their shares to the ESOP: For one thing,
under specified conditions a shareholder in the sponsoring firm who sells shares to the
ESOP may defer any taxable gain that she gleans through the sale.133 For another thing,
fifty percent of the proceeds from sale of a sponsoring firm’s stock to its ESOP are
excludable from estate taxation.134 And finally, a decedent’s estate may avoid tax-
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IRC § 61(a)(4) (including “interest” in the general definition of gross income).
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IRC § 133(a). But see Small Business Job Protection Act § § 1602(a), 1602(c) (repealing the
interest exclusion previously allowed under IRC § 133(a) for all securities acquisition loans made after August
20, 1996, except for loans made pursuant to a binding written contract which was in effect before June 10, 1996).
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This is true “by definition,” so to speak – the revenue code’s definition of corporate taxable
“income.” See IRC § 311(a) (providing that a corporation may not deduct dividends from its gross
income).
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IRC § 404(k).
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IRC §§ 501(a), (c), (d). This advantage is not unique to ESOPs as distinguished from other
ERISA plans.
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IRC § 1042. Among the conditions are that proceeds of the sale must be reinvested within one
year in a domestic corporation, and that after the sale the ESOP will own at least thirty percent of the
sponsoring firm’s shares.
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IRC § 2057.
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induced liquidity problems by shedding a portion of its estate tax liability to an ESOP,
provided that it convey to that ESOP shares in the sponsoring firm of equal value in
exchange.135
2. Additional ERISA Advantages
There are further ERISA advantages, in addition to the just noted tax advantages,
designed to encourage ESOP share-acquisitions from non-ESOP shareholders in the
sponsoring firm: Pension plans ordinarily are barred from purchasing sponsoring firms’
shares not only from the sponsoring firms themselves, but from all “parties in interest” –
directors, officers and principal shareholders.136 But ERISA exempts ESOPs from that
standard.137 And ESOPs also may borrow from such parties in interest in order to acquire
employing firm stock.138
3. Publicly Conferred Governance Advantages
There is yet more to our public benefit story than just tax and ERISA inducement.
A cluster of governance advantages offered by ESOPs, in this case working through
(once again publicly afforded) corporate and securities law, offers incumbent managers
and otherwise satisfied shareholders139 an added array of incentives: First, the firm’s
immediate issuance of new shares to a nominally independent, “third party” ESOP dilutes
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IRC § 2210.
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IRC § 4975.
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ERISA § 408(e).

138

ERISA § 408(b)(3), IRC § 4975(d)(3).
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Including many newly owning employees, were they able to vote their shares. More on this
“were they” presently.
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more than the monetary value of older shares; it dilutes older shares’ voting power as
well.140 That makes it harder for unsolicited would-be acquirers to assemble a controlling
bloc of shares. And this issuance legally can in fact be “immediate,” indeed even in
express contemplation of an impending takeover bid. Thus has held the Delaware
Chancery.141
Were new employee/owners reliable voting allies of would-be firm-acquirers, of
course, the ESOP’s promise as a takeover defense would be attenuated. But as it happens
the new employee/owners are not, interest-wise, reliable such allies at all; indeed quite
the contrary. And employee preferences scarcely matter in these cases in any event, for
the new employee/beneficiaries of leveraged ESOPs do not typically receive voting
rights, at least not right away.142 That itself constitutes, of course, another incentive for
ESOP-creation, an incentive enjoyed by the managers: ESOPs work to free managers’
hands from such dissatisfied shareholders – including any employee shareholders – as
140

I say “nominally” independent here partly owing to the role of the sponsoring firm’s board in
selecting and directing, indeed even functioning as, the ESOP trustee – see note 104, supra – and partly
owing several ESOP governance features to be noted presently.
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See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del.Ch., 1989). But see NCR
Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 761 F.Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
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A few details will be in order here. Most stock held by ESOPs considered in aggregate is
nonvoting stock: The median ESOP holds ten percent of its sponsoring firm’s shares, but only five percent
of that firm’s voting rights. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP
PLANS: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK OWNERSHIP 39-40
(1986). How can this be? First partition the class of ESOPs into those sponsored by closely held, and
those sponsored by publicly traded, firms. Now consider the first of those subclasses: With little
exception, closely held sponsoring firms enjoy all applicable ESOP tax benefits even if their ESOPs do not
pass acquired stock voting rights through to employee/beneficiaries. The only exception is in respect of
voting as to “fundamental” transactions – matters which must, according to charter or applicable law, be
decided by supermajorities of outstanding shares voted. IRC §§ 409(e)(3), 401(a)(22). Next the second
subclass: While in the case of publicly held firms voting rights must in fact be passed through to the
employee/beneficiaries, that is so only in respect of stock actually allocated to employee accounts. IRC §
4975(e)(7). But the allocation occurs only gradually as the original loan is amortized. Note also that this
lack of control rights ought to give pause to those who would see in the current “ESOP revolution” any real
harbinger of an incipient “workplace democracy.” The aptness to ESOPs in particular, of the concerns
raised by Professor Alexander in connection with contemporary pension practice more generally, is perhaps
troublingly ironic. See Alexander, supra note 62 passim.
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there might be. So it seems more than likely that the ESOP’s utility in warding off
takeovers, and its strengthening managerial hands, also might account in significant
measure for ESOPs’ proliferation. And that utility itself, again, like the favorable tax and
ERISA treatment, amounts to a public benefit. It is sanctioned and indeed affirmatively
encouraged by legislation and court decision alike.
4. Bringing It All Together: A Telling Counterfactual
It surely cannot be objectionable, then, to suggest that the legislative and judicial
favoring of ESOPs – hence ESOPs’ amounting to a public benefit – might be playing a
role in their spread.143 But we quickly can sharpen, as well as supplement, the point here
by appeal to a stylized scenario: We’ll suppose there is no tax- or ERISA-favoring of
finance of the firm through the ESOP; the same loan on the same terms can be had by
other means. We’ll also assume that ESOPs offer no governance or takeover-avoidance
advantages. We’ll further suppose that employees do not temper their wage demands by
dint of their ESOP benefit; their new shares are “all gravy.” And finally we’ll suppose
that our laborers’ gradually growing “ownership” does not appreciably boost shopfloor
morale hence productivity and firm-profitability. Under these circumstances, what is
happening in Figure 1, above? It’s pretty clear: The firm, via the ESOP, is financing its
projects by borrowing and repaying, and while at it just happens to be issuing new stock
to employees who pay nothing. But that means the value of pre-ESOP shares is diluted
by the value of the newly issued ESOP shares, with no offsetting advantages enjoyed by
the pre-ESOP shareholders. Why don’t the latter object?
143

I am far from the first to suggest the importance of public support for the spread. See, e.g.,
BLASI, supra note 98; HANSMANN, supra note 112; ELLERMAN, supra note 114; and sources cited infra,
note 146.
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There are less proximate political answers, I believe, to which we shall turn in a
moment. But the more immediate reason of course is that several of the aforemade
suppositions, as we have seen, do not obtain. There are considerable tax, ERISA, and
governance advantages gleaned through ESOPs. There is also some evidence that
employees do temper wage demands in view of the ESOP benefit – that there might even
be an “implicit bargain” to this effect – but this can be no more than a small part of the
story.144 Only the supposition that growing ownership fails to make much difference to
productivity appears, in the light of what evidence we have, to be by and large correct.
So the tax, ERISA and governance advantages – the cluster of public benefits – enjoyed
by ESOPs must surely be critical to their spread. Pre-ESOP shareholders, at least the less
other-regarding ones,145 are willing to endure the dilution of their shares wrought by
leveraged ESOP transactions. And they are willing to do so precisely because the now
much more cheaply (because tax- and ERISA-favoredly) debt-financed firm is
sufficiently more valuable, in consequence, as wholly or partly to offset the dilution.
And to what ever degree those shareholders are not wholly compensated in this way, the
control benefits imparted by ESOPs to management make up the difference; any
dissatisfied shareholders are weakened by the court-sanctioned ESOP transactions.

144

For one thing, the evidence is scant. See ELLERMAN, supra note 114, at 90; BLASI, supra note
98, at 263. Perhaps more importantly, as a theoretical matter it seems highly unlikely that rational
employees would be willing to reduce their wages sufficiently to offset the dilution. The diluting shares
issued them are, after all, deferred compensation. And as we’ll see they confer none of the consumption
benefits of control. And finally, of course, they are undiversified investments. It would be far more
sensible for employees who were willing to sacrifice pay for stock to insist upon voting, and/or diversified
stock, hence not to offer any sacrifices sufficient to offset the dilution of their own firms’ owners’ stock.
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The other-regarding ones might partly be actuated by the ideological/political motivations that
we shall discuss presently.
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C. Why: Accounting for the Favor
So now assuming, plausibly it seems, that law-conferred tax, ERISA and
governance benefits constitute a, if not the, critical reason for ESOPs’ proliferating, we
are faced with another question: Why is this public favoring of ESOPs politically
accepted? Doesn’t the support tamper with “natural” market forces, and isn’t distortion
of this sort disfavored?146 I think it is here that we – or at any rate those who suspect that
a completed American “ownership society” will have to spread business capital as it has
spread homes and higher educations – shall find the successes of ESOPs instructive. For
there are mutually reinforcing ideological and endowment-psychological reasons that
appear to account for the public favoring of ESOPs, and even indeed for the private
favoring of ESOPs as well.
1. Core Values
The key to the ESOP’s political success probably lies in its giving expression to a
cluster of interlinked legal-cum-political values and endowment-psychological
dispositions that are shared by a broad swathe of Americans. Values-wise, we are most
of us “responsibility-tracing,” or “luck-,” egalitarians:147 We believe that what people
have should ideally be traceable to equal initial holdings of such ethically exogenous
resources and opportunities – favors of fortune, of chance or mere circumstance – as no
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Certainly some seem to think so. See, e.g., Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45
TAX L. REV. 363 (1990); Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion,
23 HARV. J. LEGIS. 103 (1986).
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See Hockett, sources cited supra notes 2 at 31-51, 5 at 57-68, 17 at 142-73. Also Robert
Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as
Guarantors of Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion, 36 METAPHIL. 93, 97 (2005), reprinted in
GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: ACHIEVING GLOBAL JUSTICE (Christian Barry & Thomas
Pogge eds., 2006) (hereinafter “Three (Potential) Pillars”).
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one now living is responsible for having created.148 And we believe that departures from
that baseline ideally would be the product of value-additive or -detractive effort – of
choice not chance – for which people are responsible.149 It is tempting to think of access
to value-adding opportunity – hence to business capital as well as to dwelling space and
basic “human capital” – as part of that ethically exogenous endowment to which all
should ideally enjoy equal access.150
2. Endowment Dispositions
Endowment-psychological dispositions-wise, we are apt to experience some
methods of redressing imbalances in the distribution of that aforementioned exogenous
endowment as less discomfiting than others.151 So, for example, our more self-regarding,
less altruistic selves are apt to be friendlier toward distributing perceivedly “new”
resources to the presently underendowed, than toward “taking” already held resources for
redistributive purposes.152 Those same selves will regard a perceived “refraining from
taking” from the underendowed as preferable to a mere “giving” to the same.153 And
finally, the self-regarding will be more amenable to any “giving” to the degree that it can
be framed more as a rewarding – hence as ethically endogenized, i.e. “earned” or
“deserved” by the recipient.154
148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

See Hockett, sources cited supra notes 2 at 58-72, 80-87, 5 at 73-83.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Id.

42

3. How the SOP Structure Conforms
The leveraged ESOP coheres rather nicely with these values and dispositions. It
spreads a basic endowment – access to productive nonhuman capital, that modern-day
analogue to the Homesteading and Land-Grant era’s land – which it is not difficult to
view as being, at least in part or potential, ethically exogenous.155 It spreads that
endowment by distributing what can saliently, if nonetheless superficially, be viewed as
“new” capital – newly issued shares in firms.156 It does that partly in what resembles a
return for reward-earning effort – labor patronage or work for the firm.157 And it
encourages private such rewarding (on the part of lenders and otherwise-diluted
shareholders) largely by refraining from perceived taking (i.e., through tax breaks) rather
than transparent taking and giving.
In a way, then, the leveraged ESOP replicates, in piecemeal and somewhat more
convoluted fashion, the same strategies that we have employed more elegantly in
connection with publicly facilitated home-spreading and education-spreading since the
early-mid-twentieth century.158 And this, I am confident, is no accident. Indeed there is
considerable historical evidence suggesting that the ESOP was expressly inspired by the
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It is in part or potential ethically exogenous in two senses, one trivial, the other less so. First,
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federal home finance programs set in place over the 1930s and 1940s.159 There is also
good evidence to the effect that both these and the federal education finance programs set
in place over the 1960s and 1970s were found appealing to legislators and public alike
precisely in owing to their resonance with the values and dispositions just rehearsed.160
But then this raises a further question: Is the leveraged ESOP the complete business
capital analogue to our contemporary home- and education-spreading programs? Is the
“three-legged stool” of a completed “ownership society” now well on the way toward
being built thanks to the spread of the ESOP?
III. NOT YET ENOUGH SOPS: WHY THE ESOP FALLS SHORT OF OUR HOPES
Notwithstanding its admirable respect for and resonance with the values and
endowment sensibilities rehearsed in II.C, the ESOP falls very far short of a full business
capital analogue to our home- and higher education-spreading programs. This is so for a
few simple reasons, some quite familiar, others perhaps less so. We can run through
them quickly, setting the stage in so doing for new SOP-types that we shall see boast the
same – and yet greater – benefits as the ESOP while shedding the latter’s limitations.
A. Income Risk Concentration
Begin with the limitations, at least one of which is familiar. The first (and most
familiar) inadequacy of ESOPs is their concentrating income risk among beneficiaries.
ESOP promoters tout ESOPs as affording their beneficiaries a “second income,” a chance
to be “capitalists” as well as “laborers.” That in turn affords workers, we’re told, a “piece
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of the action,” a chance to get in on “the stock market boom,” hence to realize capital
gains such as have tended to rise much of late.161 The “second income” also, the ESOP’s
inventor has in effect told us, will bring workers’ earnings into closer proportional
alignment with the relative contributions made by capital and labor as aggregate factors
of production in any advanced economy.162
All of this is true enough so far as it goes. But it does not go very far. For the
problem is that, “second income” though the capital income might be, it nonetheless
issues from the same source as the labor income – from the individual employing firm. If
one of our reasons for taking interest in ESOPs, as potential firm-spreading engines of a
completed American “ownership society,” is that they spread the contemporary analogue
to 19th Century Homesteading’s sustenance-yielding land, then presumably we shall want
what ESOPs spread to be as close as it can be to being as secure a sustenance-yielder as
was land. But the capital incomes thrown off by firms are hardly more secure than the
labor incomes paid out by firms.163 Certainly they are not as much more secure as they
might be; and they are of course no more secure if the labor itself is not there to be had.
B. Business Cycles, Downsizing, Outsourcing, Human Capital Lock-in &
Long-Term Unemployment
That last observation points to a second, though of course cognate, weakness of
ESOPs. The fact is that one reason for our interest in sources of income additional to
161
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labor is precisely that labor is not always there to be had. Jobs, firms, job-descriptions
and even entire industries come and go.164 “Downsizing” and global “outsourcing”
regularly disemploy labor, sometimes for lengthy periods. Regular macroeconomic
slumps do the same. Often, moreover, prospective laborers have developed their “human
capital” in manners specific to particular industries, job-types and even firms.165 It can be
difficult, then – particularly for older workers – to “retool” for new firms or tasks.166 In
the event of long term troughs in the business cycle, many workers indeed can be left in
that cold.167 It is far from optimal, then, to condition the benefit that is stock-spreading
upon labor alone, when it is in part precisely the possible absence of employment
opportunity at times that accounts for our interest in stock-spreading in the first place.
A related point here, from an opportunity cost point of view, is that reliable
“second incomes” presumably would buttress aggregate consumer demand in the event of
downturns in the business cycle. That would lessen the amplitude of troughs in the cycle
and presumably thereby keep more people employed, for longer.168 So there is
affirmative, not merely negative, reason to diversify reliable sources of income among
citizens. But “reliable” here, as elsewhere, will again ride on diversification. So again it
is best not to restrict a worker’s capital income to the same source as her labor income.
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See Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra note 17 at 174-82 and sources cited therein, on this
and the following several sentences.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. See also FISCHER BLACK, BUSINESS CYCLES AND EQUILIBRIUM (1987); ROBERT E. LUCAS,
MODELS OF BUSINESS CYCLES (1987); MODERN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY (Robert J. Barro ed., 1989);
EDMUND S. PHELPS, STRUCTURAL SLUMPS (1994).
168

It would afford, that is to say, what we might call a manner of “automatic Keynesianism.” See
Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5 at 129.
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C. It Exploits Only One Form of Patronage
That last observation highlights the fact that one way of viewing the more
obvious, just-rehearsed disadvantages of ESOPs is as insufficiently capitalizing upon a
more bountiful opportunity. Our final two criticisms are more transparently of this form.
ESOPs are needlessly hobbled. We both can and should be more ambitious. For we can
attain much more benefit at no more political or other cost.
To begin with, consider again why the ESOP is publicly favored: It spreads a
perceivedly “new” resource (newly issued business capital shares) in a manner that partly
is subsidized by refraining from taking (from taxing) rather than by forthright “giving.”
And it does so in exchange for apparently benefit-warranting behavior (labor) by
beneficiaries. But now note how low the ESOP sets the sights in conforming to that
abstract description:
First, labor for a firm is far from the only sort of activity that might be perceived
as affording warrant to publicly encouraged firm-share-spreading. People patronize, and
in some cases even are potentially expropriated by, firms in any number of ways. There
are long-term customers whom we call “loyal,” suggesting that sometimes people endow
firms with their trust or the benefit of their habits. There are firms that enjoy increasing
returns or reap other kinds of rents, suggesting that sometimes people might even less
voluntarily confer unrecouped benefits upon firms. And there even are people who
confer benefits upon all of the rest of us through their national service, or who suffer
disadvantages through no fault of their own hence who are arguably compensable in
justice.
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All of this suggests that we might employ citizen attributes – “desert bases,” we
might call them169 – additional to firm-labor expenditure as means of ethically
underwriting the benefit that is publicly augmented firm-spreading. In so far as that is the
case, the ESOP, relying as it does solely upon firm-labor as basis, appears needlessly
hamstrung indeed. Part IV, below, accordingly assesses ESOP-analogues predicated
upon more than just labor relations.
D. It Exploits Only One Source of Credit
Second, consider the natural limitation inherent in reliance upon tax-breaks alone
as means of financing the broad spread of firm-shares. The ESOP, we noted, is
underwritten in large part by the government’s agreement simply to take less in taxes
from firms that expand through debt-financing while spreading new shares to employees.
But this means that share-spreading is limited (a) to the remaining increment of taxable
income that the government can agree not to tax, and (b) by firms’ individual
creditworthiness as partly determined by (a). That, like the limitation to labor as sole
benefit-warranting patronage relation to firms, would seem unduly limited. For there are
more kinds, grounds and possible enhancements of credit than tax-cut-enhanced firm
credit. There is beneficiary credit, for example; and there is the public’s own “full faith
and credit.” And there is the credit-enhancement afforded by mortgage-insurance, by
mortgage-backed securitization, or by both.
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I borrow the term from Joel Feinberg. See Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in JOEL
FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ARTICLES IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY, 55-94, 58-61 (1970). A
“desert base” is simply the warrant for a claim that one is deserving of something. My bravery in combat
might be the desert base underlying my receipt of the Silver Star for Valor. My persuading warring parties
to lay down their arms might similarly ground my receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize. Etc.
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These additional credit-types and enhancements figure quite prominently and
effectively in our federal home- and education-finance programs.170 Those programs
have long since their inceptions come to constitute the two “legs” we now have in place
for that “three-legged stool” that a completed American “ownership society” would be.
But this suggests, in yet another way, that the ESOP sets our sights much too low when it
comes to capital-spreading. Part V, below, accordingly considers what it would be to
generalize federal home- and education-finance policy to the case of nonhuman capital
shares.
First, though, as promised above we shall generalize the ESOP itself, along the
earlier mentioned patronage relation. For we shall see that moving from labor to other
patronage forms not only takes us quite far even before we reach the credit dimension,
but also sets the stage nicely for our tackling that latter dimension itself.
IV. MORE SOPS FOR THE DESERVING: ADAPTING THE STRUCTURE TO OTHER
PATRONAGE FORMS
So the ESOP falls short as a stand-alone method of business capital spreading.
But that need not lead us, in thinking through what it will be to complete an American
“ownership society,” to abandoning SOPs altogether. There are ways we might
generalize the ESOP idea, along both of the dimensions we’ve noted. Those, recall, are
the patronage and credit dimensions. In this Part we work along the former.
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See Part V.B, infra. Fuller accounts can be found in Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note
5, at 104-20, 146-53.
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Begin by observing that labor with a firm – the employment relation – is an
ethically salient patronage relation:171 It is an ongoing relational mode between persons
and firms.172 And it is a relation that appears to afford sanction to the conferral of
benefits upon persons.173 It renders the latter apparently “earning” or “deserving” of the
benefits bestowed upon labor through leveraged ESOP financing.174 That was one upshot
of Part I.C above.
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So far as I have been able to determine, the only scholar who has devoted much discussion to
the relations between patronage and firm ownership is Hansmann. See HANSMANN, supra note 112,
passim. My employment of the concept will be somewhat different from Hansmann’s, however – as is
indicated by my addition of the qualifier “ethically salient” – and my understanding of the term will
accordingly be somewhat different as well. They will not, however, be incompatible with Hansmann’s.
For more on this, see notes 172 and 173, infra.
172

Hansmann appears to be less explicitly concerned with the “ongoingness” of patronage
relations, while being more explicitly concerned with a particular species of relating to the firm – viz.,
selling to or purchasing from it – than I. See note 173, infra. I think our distinct concerns with patronage
nonetheless compatible, however. For, first, my concern with the possible ethical salience of patronage
naturally lends itself to an emphasis upon longer-term relations, at least among those who purchase from or
contribute to firms in small increments per transaction. (Duration of relating substitutes for magnitude or
individual transaction.) And, second, I think patronage relations as something more than purchasing and
selling alone are implicit even in Hansmann’s own understanding of the term, as evidenced by Hansmann’s
own frequent recourse to the broader relational concept of “supplying,” which figures prominently in his
treatment of stock-holders as financial capital suppliers. See HANSMANN, id. at 12.
173

Hansmann defines “patrons” as “persons who transact with a firm either as purchasers of the
firm’s products or as sellers to the firm of supplies, labor, or other factors of production.” Id. at 12. Much
of the thrust of Hansmann’s insightful monograph is devoted to showing both (a) that it is typically a
particular class of patrons which owns most of the firms operating within a particular industry, and (b) why
it is that the particular classes which tend to own in particular industries end up being the more efficient
owners. My interest in this Article, though not, I think, incompatible with Hansmann’s interest, is
nonetheless distinct, and the distinction accounts for my somewhat broadened understanding and
employment of the concept of patronage. My concern is with patronage as a form of ongoing relation
between persons and firms such as can be viewed in part as the patron’s consistent conferral of some
manner of benefit upon the firm, such as in turn can engage our willingness to view the patron’s coming to
own a share of the firm as ethically unobjectionable – as something better than a mere “handout.” That is
to say that my angle on patronage here is as a “desert basis” in the sense described supra, note 169. I do
not believe that this basis for interest in patronage places me in any way at odds with Hansmann’s
efficiency-grounded basis for interest in the same. For I do not here suggest that firms should be owned by
patrons of a different kind than those that he views as the more efficient owners of firms in particular
industries. Rather, I simply propose that more patrons within the class be added to the rosters of owners.
The remainder of this Part, I believe, will both make this plain and unpack more fully the ways in which
patronage relations might be seen ethically to underwrite benefit-conferrals upon current non-owners
within patronage classes.
174

Please see the discussion in Part II.C, supra, which suggests reasons why we publicly favor

ESOPs.
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Yet labor is also but one way in which people relate themselves ongoingly to
firms. And from the point of view of Part III, it is a problematical mode for purposes of
completing an “ownership society.” For if we piggy-back the public benefit of
encouraged ownership-spreading upon labor with the very firms whose shares are to be
spread, then we forgo one of the principal benefits that afford reasons for finding owning
attractive: owning’s capacity to diversify income risk, and to substitute for labor when
labor’s not there to be had.175
But this raises an intriguing prospect: Perhaps we might rely upon patronage
relations additional to the employment relation in order to warrant the public facilitation
of ownership-spreading, relations that do not concentrate or suboptimally diversify risk to
incomes. This Part proposes and assesses a few possibilities. No one of these
possibilities need cover all of the ground that we wish to cover. It will suffice if all of
them together, layered progressively atop one another as in the case of a map that attains
to more detail as overlay upon overlay is gradually laid over it, afford significantly more
coverage than we thus far have managed. And the fact that just about everyone
patronizes more firms via each of the modes now to be discussed than s/he patronizes via
the employment relation affords hope as well – hope that we might indeed diversify each
person’s capital ownings.
A. Customer Stock Ownership Plans

175

Again, diversifying such risk is one of the very reasons, I think, that we find the notion of an
“ownership society” alluring. Responsible independence.
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One conspicuous form of patronage reminiscent of labor is ongoing
customership.176 Some firms from which we purchase goods and services are firms from
which we regularly purchase them. In some cases that consistency is attributable to
something like “customer loyalty” – an investment of trust, rather than labor, in the firm.
In other cases the “loyalty” is perhaps not what we should call voluntary, but reflects a
lack of available alternatives – our being held hostage, so to speak. And there are of
course middling cases between those extremes – unthinking habit or ignorance of
alternative supply sources, for example. In all such cases, however, we can plausibly
imagine the relation to be sufficiently salient, from an ethical point of view, as to warrant
some degree of public facilitation of patrons’ gradually coming to own parts of the firms
that they regularly patronize.177
Consider a homespun example: There might be a small university town centrally
located, hence perhaps somewhat geographically isolated, in a large U.S. state.178 People
who live and work in the town see a lot of each other over time, and have come to feel a
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Indeed, in some industries customers constitute the most efficient class of firm-owners.
Examples are the farm supply industry, in which consumer cooperatives constitute an oft-encountered firm
form; rural electricity, in which customer cooperatives again figure prominently; clubs that afford their
members high-status “associative goods,” which again tend to be owned by their members; and urban
housing, in which housing cooperatives figure prominently. See generally HANSMANN, supra note 102, at
147-223.
177

Again, sometimes this happens quite “naturally,” for reasons that appear to be rooted in the
comparative efficiencies of governance and contracting. See note 164, supra. But the reasons for interest
in an “ownership society” warrant our considering the fostering of ownership even where it does not quite
“naturally” arise, which of course seems to be what has occurred in the case of ESOP proliferation. See
Part II, supra.
178

I am of course thinking of Ithaca, NY, where I live. But there are countless similarly situated
locales, not all of them university towns and not all of them as relatively isolated as Ithaca. Indeed this
example might also be plausibly applied, say, to a community-like neighborhood or sector of a large city,
such as is commonly found in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Please also bear in mind that the
example following this one will make no reference to community-like towns at all. All examples in this
Article are meant to be illustrative and suggestive, even to spur additional visualizations; they do not
purport to be exclusive or exhaustive.
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palpable sense of community in consequence. They feel this not only in relation one to
another, but even in relation to the relatively small number of retail establishments that
sell to the townspeople. Buyers and sellers are thrown all together, even feel somewhat
“centrally isolated” together, perhaps even miss this feeling when sometimes they visit
one or another of the large, coastal cities five or so hours’ drive away.
Now a marvelous new grocery store complex might come to this town.179
Everyone talks about this new store, even showing it off to visitors and prospective new
residents. Nearly everyone living or working within several miles of the town might
purchase their groceries at this store, leave and pick up their dry cleaning there, do their
banking there, even leave their children to be attended there while engaging in the
aforementioned transactions. Things might go on this way for years. That’s an ongoing,
many-faceted relation. Now suppose that we found the idea of an “ownership society” to
be an attractive one, for any number of reasons,180 hence thought that it might make for
good public policy to encourage wider holdings of firms. In that circumstance, might we
not find it politically acceptable, indeed affirmatively attractive, to work to encourage the
voluntary spread of shares in this store or its holding company among all of the regular
customers who live in community with and partly organize their lives around it, just as
we do in the case of employees? We certainly might.181
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I am of course alluding to Wegman’s in Ithaca NY. This firm is not publicly traded, so I am
asking that the reader pretend that it is.
180

I consider the variety of grounds upon, and the three principal American political traditions to
which, the notion of an “ownership society” might be attractive in Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note
2, at 5-78.
181

It is of course not the case that facilitating ownership of local businesses will afford optimal
diversification. After all, personal incomes and the incomes of town-sharing or region-sharing firms can to
some extent co-vary – in the case, for example, of local or regional slumps. But I ask that the reader bear
with me a bit longer. As examples proliferate below we shall see that diversification grows. Moreover, our
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Consider a cognate example, one perhaps applicable to larger metropolitan areas
or regions now in addition to smaller communities: There might be a product or service
the supply of which enjoys increasing returns. It is a “natural monopoly.”182 Perhaps it’s
a transport system, an electrical power grid or highspeed internet network – a public or
publicly regulated utility. Customers of the “firms” that supply such products and
services, whether identified by reference to towns, cities or larger regions serviced by
these firms, often might find themselves more or less “stuck” with their suppliers. They
have little choice but to patronize them. That’s a large part of why we regulate them.
But might the same rationale not then warrant our facilitating the customers’ gradually
coming to own them, at least in part? Isn’t customer hostagehood at least as ethically
salient a patronage-form as customer loyalty?
Were we to answer “yes” to the last two questions, then we might well decide it
worthwhile to consider facilitating the acquisition of shares in the firms – the grocery
store or the utility – by their patrons in much the same way that we facilitate shareacquisition in firms by employees. We might tax-break-assist firms in debt-financing
themselves, in exchange for their issuing shares to trusts whose beneficiaries gradually
came legally to own what initially they would beneficially own. (Again, perhaps, in
proportion to their patronage – e.g., amounts purchased from the firms.) In essence, then,
aim here is to make use of patronage relations as ethically salient grounds for public action facilitating
ownership, pursuant both (a) to the hypothesis posited supra, Part II.C, concerning why the public is
willing to subsidize ESOP expansion, and (b) to the further elaboration of that hypothesis in this Article’s
predecessor pieces, concerning why we have acted similarly to promote home-owning and higher education
spreading in the way that we have done. Finally, please note that I have already addressed the project of
democratizing income-risk-sharing across localities and even across nations in a separate article: See
Hockett, Macro-Hedging, supra note 17 at 212-56. My hope is that all of these pieces together afford at
least a rough template for how best to render our society more “owning,” more risk-spread-efficient and
more just.
182

In a way, of course, so was the store in the previous example. Small towns support less
competition among smallish suppliers than do cities.
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we would just replicate the financial structure of the leveraged ESOP arrangement. Only
the particular patronage relation would change. We might call it a “Customer Stock
Ownership Plan,” or “CuSOP.”183 Imagine it thus:
Figure 2: Institutional/Financial Structure of a CuSOP Arrangement
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Of course some things even apart from the differing patronage relation that
ethically grounds it would be different here relative to the ESOP as presently constituted.
There is no, say, federal “CRISA” for “customer benefit plans,” for example, in the way
that there is an ERISA structure upon which ESOP programs partly are built. Nor,
183

This SOP is not to be confused with a “consumer stock ownership plan” proposed by Kelso.
See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 121 at 67-73.
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accordingly, does the revenue code currently include any provisions that might
“incentivize” firm-financing through CuSOPs as it does in the case of ESOPs. But that is
all beside the point. The point is that all of the means by which we currently facilitate
stock-acquisition by employees could be replicated to facilitate stock-acquisition by longterm customers – loyal customers, hostage customers, or “in-between” customers. We
could legislate to replicate, all with a view to making owners of long-term customers as
we do for long-term employees. And the public benefit that this legislation would
effectively confer – like that which public ESOP facilitation confers – would be
warranted, could be advocated, and presumably would be politically embraced, on
essentially the same grounds: the grounds of ethically salient patronage.
CuSOPs might even enjoy broader public support than do ESOPs, in fact, on
patronage grounds. For, in contrast to the case of ESOPs, we could facilitate shareacquiring via CuSOPs by any given long-term customer from any number of firms – even
far-flung firms – that she regularly patronized. Everyone bearing long-term customerpatronage relations to x number of firms would gradually become a part-owner of those
very x firms. ESOPs do this for employees only in respect of the smaller number of firms
– often but one – for which the employee labors. If more people stand to benefit, and if
they stand to do so by acquiring stakes in more than one firm each, we might expect more
popular support.
B. Resource or Rent-Recouping Stock Ownership Plans
Let’s try another one. Sometimes new resources are discovered. Petroleum
reserves are found in Alaska, newly exploitable minerals are found in magnesium
nodules just off of the coast, some portion of the electromagnetic spectrum becomes
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usable in a way that it was not before. Sometimes no particular living person or group of
persons is to be fully credited with the discovery, or with the discovery’s full
exploitability. But some such person or persons often can plausibly be partly so credited.
And our way of doing things in any event is to permit private agents – generally firms –
to exploit the new possibilities – to appropriate “rents” from them.184 So we want some
of the value of the new resources – rents – to flow very quickly into private hands, even
while not all of that value seems to be deserved by those parties.
What should we do with the surplus? We might “windfall profits” tax it, but that
might resemble a kind of incremental “taking,”185 and the takings go to the government.
We don’t seem to like that kind of thing any more.186 At any rate we don’t find it as
palatable as we once did, perhaps because we are less trusting of the users of the takings
– “the government” – than we once were.187 But we still like ownership – we like that
very much, in fact – and we are aware that by definition nobody has earned a windfall.
So why not widen the distribution of shares in the firms that we authorize to exploit the
new opportunities?

184

The appropriable rents justification for property rights appears to originate with Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 347 (1967).
185

Legally speaking this claim, associated with Richard Epstein, is of course hyperbolic. But one
can readily grasp the intuition that underwrites it. For the hyperbole, see, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
186

See, e.g., EPSTEIN, id., for a representative screed. See also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN
SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005), for a
morbidly fascinating, indeed chilling, documentary account of the exploitation of citizen cognitive error by
champions of the tax-evading wealthy.
187

Perhaps it all began with the disillusionments of the 1960s, which seem to have fed directly
into the populist “tax revolts” of the 1970s, out of which so much of current Republican Party ideology
seems to have grown.
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So far, so good. But this still leaves open the question of patronage. To whom
should the shares be distributed? Is there some “natural,” salient class of patrons whose
beneficiary status would be as readily warranted as that of employees and long-term
customers? After all, we presumably would not wish simply to replace one class of
windfall beneficiaries with another, as it were at random. How, then, to think about the
matter? I think that we might employ a sort of “sliding scale” here. And indeed this
might be a nice way gradually to generalize the original ESOP idea all the way out, so to
speak – i.e., to move incrementally in the direction of broad public recognition that good
citizenship itself is a kind of patronage.
Let us think along those lines for a moment: Some new resources might be
broadly perceived as bearing some special nexus to the places where they are found.
Such places, in turn, might be perceived as being somehow ethically “closer” or “more
proximate” to – as it were “more owned by” – their residents than by nonresidents.188 So,
for example new oil found in Alaska might be perceived as being somehow, somewhat
more saliently Alaskan even than American. And Alaskan citizens might accordingly be
thought to stand in a somewhat – even if but incrementally – closer patronage relation to
any firm granted rights to exploit new Alaskan oil reserves than are non-Alaskan
Americans.189 Alaska itself is constitutionally permitted, after all, to tax firms that extract
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I am exceedingly uncomfortable with this idea, and find it to be a compromise with
psychological dispositions that are regrettable at best. But bear with me for a moment. Some such
primitive intuition as this seems to underwrite the judgment that coal found between Canada and Mexico is
“American” coal, rather than North American coal or “the coal of mankind,” for example. Ideally I’d
prefer to repudiate the intuition, but if we’re stuck with it then we may as well harness it to good purpose.
189

In 1978 and 1980, voters’ initiatives were introduced to establish the Alaska General Stock
Ownership Corporation (AGSOC), which would have provided Alaskan citizens ownership interests in the
Alaska Oil Pipeline. Pursuant to a tentative agreement with the British Petroleum Company, the latter was
to sell its interest in the Alaska Pipeline to AGSOC. AGSOC would have enjoyed the backing of state
credit to borrow. Under federal matching legislation – specifically, Subchapter U of Chapter 1 under
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Alaskan oil reserves, even after the federal IRS has done so. So it must be the case that
we view the citizens of political units as being somehow more privileged than noncitizens
in respect of the benefits brought by the resources that are found and exploited within the
geographic boundaries of those units. Cognate observations to these “Alaskan”
observations might hold true in respect of magnesium nodules found off the coast of
Washington, Oregon and California. And so on.
Now let us bring these patronage considerations together with the earlier
rehearsed “windfall” considerations. Would it be too far a stretch to require, as a
condition for granting the rights to exploit the new resource to the firm, that the firm
distribute shares in itself to the residents of any municipality or state with which the new
resource is widely perceived to be especially closely associated? (E.g., residents of any
municipality or state that currently might tax the enterprise that exploits the resources?)
Note that if the answer is “no, it would not be a stretch,” then we might not have to
bother with tax or other incentives at all. Or how about this: We combine tax and other
incentives with the “carrot” that is the prospective new resource exploitation itself, in a
manner that enables us to lessen the former relative to what they were in the ESOP and
CuSOP cases. We thereby less expensively (to the public fisc) “incentivize” both the

Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code – AGSOC would also have enjoyed favorable federal income tax
treatment. See Title VI, Revenue Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2885 (1978). The AGSOC plan also would have
prohibited any one individual from taking ownership of more than ten shares, in order to prevent
concentrated ownership. See Alaska, Inc., an Economic Experiment; Senator’s Plan Would Distribute
State’s New Wealth to Citizens; Alaska Inc., an Experiment in Distributing New Wealth, THE WASHINGTON
POST, October 22, 1978, Sunday, Final Edition. The Alaskan ballot measure nevertheless lost on a close
popular vote (approximately 78,000 to 72,000). See, e.g., the Alaskan state government website, available
at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/initbal.htm; and the National Institute of Democracy website,
available at http://www.ni4d.us/people/gravel2.htm. Notwithstanding the failure of the ballot initiative,
Alaska did adopt a cognate program. See infra, note 191.
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entry of firms to do the exploiting and those firms’ spreading their shares. Call it a
“RentSOP.”190 It might look like this:
Figure 3: Institutional/Financial Structure of a RentSOP Arrangement
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That’s right. This is the same diagram as Figures 1 and 2, with state or local
citizens standing in as patrons now instead of employees or customers. (So now the

190

This is not to be confused with Kelso’s proposed “RECOPs,” “GSOPs” or “COMCOPs,”
which, though apparently geared toward spreading ownership of some firms cognate with those under
consideration here, are both (a) argued for on different grounds, and more importantly (b) presumably for
that reason, differently financial-structured. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 121 at 99-103, 75-83, 88-92.
For a more general charitable interpretation and correction of Kelsonian “theories” and schemes, see
Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5 at 124-42.
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degree of patronage might track years of residence.191) What is different, apart from the
changed patronage basis here ethically grounding the public benefit, is simply that the tax
and other benefits afforded by the public are less than before, since the exploitation rights
are themselves a benefit. (That is entailed by the “windfall” considerations.) The loan
made to the RentSOP trust might have to be participated as well; possibly it would be too
large for any one lender to make.192 But all of that is, again, for present purposed neither
here nor there. The important point is that the firm still finds itself debt-financing itself
on favorable terms in the interest of boosting its capacity to exploit the newly exploitable
resources, and spreading ownership in itself in the process.
Now note, in connection with our hope of maximizing both the number of
possible beneficiaries and the number of firms that beneficiaries might gradually come
partly to own, that we can readily broaden our understanding of “local resource.”
Matters here, that is to say, are as they were in connection with CuSOPs in Part IV.A, just
above: Candidates for RentSOPs can be proliferated.

191

I ignore, for present purposes, the matter of crafting terms so as to avoid conflict with court
decisions overturning interstate-travel-burdening state laws, decided under the Commerce Clause of Article
I of, the Privileges and Immunities or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to, or some
“penumbral emanation” from those or other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. In Zobel v. Williams, the
Supreme Court rejected Alaska legislation that awarded pipeline dividends to state residents based on the
duration of their residence up to the point at which distributions began. 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982). But
allowing the number of shares distributed thenceforth to grow with years of residence would not seem to be
constitutionally offensive so long as one could begin to accumulate shares immediately upon taking up
residence. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941).
192

Not just as a matter of capacity, but as a matter of law as well; the Bank Code’s lending limits
could kick-in. See 12 USCS § 84. (12 USCS § 84 (a)(1) requires that total outstanding non-fully-secured
loans and credit extended by a national banking association to an individual, including a trust, not exceed
fifteen percent of that banking association’s unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. 12 USCS § 84
(a)(2) additionally requires that total outstanding fully-secured loans and credit extensions made by a
national banking association not exceed ten percent of the association’s unimpaired capital and unimpaired
surplus.)
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We might broaden our understanding of “local resource” along at least two
dimensions. For one thing, we can move outward from “locality” to “region” to “nation”
– a prospect that I shall consider presently. For another thing, we can plausibly broaden
our understanding of “resource” itself. For it isn’t always a matter of found objects or
substances, after all. Might not a highly desired set of geographic coordinates count as
well – say, a “prime location” upon which some highly remunerative piece of commercial
real estate stands? It certainly might. That’s a paradigmatic case, in fact, of “rent.” And
rentiers who hold exclusionary rights to highly desired spaces are rather like the “natural
monopolists” considered in connection with CSOPs above at Part IV.A. That’s why the
“classical economists,” people like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, were so suspicious
of them.193 But we needn’t be suspicious. We can facilitate the spaces’ voluntary sale
and purchase at fair market value instead, by broad classes of locals, simply by treating
the spaces like oil reserves or magnesium nodules, and the firms that operate them like
resource-extractors, in Figure 3 just above.194 “Don’t get mad,” we might say, “get
owning – get the company.”195
193

See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 161-63 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (rent as a monopoly price, not consequent on any expense laid
out by the rentier); DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 33-45 (Dent
& Sons ed., 1987) (same, rentiers as windfall beneficiaries of scarcity).
194

Hansmann, in HANSMANN, supra note 114 at 173-79, suggests a number of reasons for the
absence of urban utility coops analogous to rural electrical coops, among them the comparative transience
of urban dwellers relative to rural dwellers and conflicts of interest among disparate classes of prospective
urban owners. While such phenomena presumably account in part for the absence of spontaneously
generated (sorry – pun foreseen but not intended) urban utility cooperatives, they do not, so far as I can see,
stand in the way of publicly facilitated partial ownership of corporate utilities by their customers.
Moreover, to what ever degree we might worry that partial ownership by customers is “not enough,” we
can readily mitigate the worry by means familiar to other, existing utilities-ownership scenarios. Hence,
rates can be regulated with a view to preventing price-discrimination as among classes of user; and any
worry over the development of, say, “absentee ownership” in the long run would seem to be mitigated or
mitigable by (a) the fact that highly transient residents of a municipality likely will not come to acquire
much in the way of shares in any event, (b) the possibility of recourse to required redemption – indeed, we
might even arrange to have transients trade their erstwhile utilities’ shares for shares in utilities located in
their new locales, with the utilities themselves in turn exchanging the shares, or at worst (c) the possibility
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Turning from the “resource” dimension to the “locality” dimension, if we move
outward from seemingly “locally located” resources to more diffuse such resources –
e.g., new portions of the electromagnetic spectrum – we can move outward along the
patronage dimension as well. We’ll thereby draw in more beneficiaries, more potential
owner-citizens. So we might imagine, say, that the Telecommunications Act of 1996196
is amended to work somewhat differently than it actually has done: Congress might not
authorize the FCC simply to grant existing broadcast companies new “advanced
spectrum,” without requiring payment therefor.197 Instead it might establish a sort of
“national RentSOP” on behalf of all citizens, and then offer the combined inducement of
occupancy over the HD bandwidths and some (diminished) tax incentives to get the firms
to spread shares in themselves to the citizenry. That would not only be a readily intuited
extension from the more “locally located” RentSOP idea; it would also amount to a
convenient bridge to the most universal SOP of all.

of recourse to mere beneficial ownership by the new owners, legal ownership to remain with consumer
trusts established for the purpose of retained legal ownership. Indeed, as Hansmann himself points out (id.,
at 177), some municipal utilities can readily be likened to cooperatives, organized, as they are, quite
similarly.
195

A variation, perhaps, on the 1979 Remington electric razor advertisement, in which Victor
Kiam averred, “I liked it so much, I bought the company.” See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1357091.stm.
196

See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), codified at 47
USCS § 251 et seq. For commentary, see PETER W. HUBER et al, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1996 (1996); and 74 Am. Jur. 2d Telecommunications § 16.
197

See 47 USCS § 336(a) (“[T]he Commission . . . should limit the initial eligibility for such
licenses [for use of advanced spectrum] to persons that (1) are licensed to operate a television broadcast
station or hold a permit to construct such a station . . . and (2) shall adopt regulations that allow the holders
of such licenses to offer such ancillary or supplementary services on designated frequencies as may be
consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity."). For a discussion of the FCC’s grant,
under the Act, of a free spectrum for HDTV, see Matthew Spitzer, Dean Krattenmaker's Road Not Taken:
The Political Economy of Broadcasting in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 353,
365-67 (1996).
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C. Citizen Stock Ownership Plans
Isn’t citizenship itself a kind of patronage198 – an ongoing relation such as can
warrant, in some cases, the public conferral of some kinds of benefit? At any rate isn’t
good citizenship so, such that everyone who “plays by the rules,” or perhaps provides
some kind of national service, can be said to deserve some solicitude, maybe the
guarantee of some “basic minimum,” from us all? Don’t we all as a group, in a sense,
feel we owe a “hand up” to those among us who share our core values, obey all our laws,
and are nonetheless “down” by the workings of fortune not fault? Isn’t that what our oftinvoked commitments to equal justice, equal worth, and equal dignity commit us to, at
the very least? And don’t our means of publicly spreading home-ownership and “human
capital” (education) give expression to precisely those commitments – commitments that
jointly add up, not to a guaranteed equality of citizens’ ultimate outcomes, of course,
since outcomes impound efforts as well as opportunities, but at least to equality of real
opportunity?199

198

Even if, in a liberal polity as that toward which our own approximates, an attenuated or “thin”
kind of patronage. The degree to which citizenship as a form of patronage is thin might track the degree to
which the polity’s “theory of the good” is thin. A polity that acknowledges “the priority of the right over
the good,” see RAWLS, supra note 4 at 27-28, will be a polity which, qua polity, maintains but a “thin”
theory of the good, see RAWLS, id. at 347-50, reserving “thicker” conceptions of what it is to lead a good
life to citizens as individual “life-planning” agents. Citizenship itself accordingly would be but minimally
defined, in bare justice terms; and claims to basic resource minima would be rooted in the basic justice to
which every citizen is entitled as a citizen. To the degree that a polity departs from the minimal liberal
ideal, however – e.g., in the direction of a “civic republic” whose citizens deliberately share certain
“thicker” values additional to that of justice (e.g., the values of shared participation and deliberation
themselves, even notwithstanding the wishes of some not be take part of deliberate) – the form of patronage
to which citizenship itself amounts will correspondingly grow “thicker.” Being a citizen will involve more
close relating with and value-sharing with ones fellow citizens qua citizens. And it might then activate
concerns we hold on behalf of others which are grounded more in fellow-feeling now as well as in bare
justice. For more on the degree to which the American polity appears to incorporate civic republican as
well as classical liberal values, see Hockett , Whose Ownership?, supra note 2 at 5-24.
199

See, e.g., Hockett, sources cited supra notes 2, 5, 17 and 147.
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I don’t believe anyone will disagree with these truths – which we do indeed
appear to hold “self-evident.”200 What we do sometimes disagree about are the empirics
of actual responsibility – the comparative degrees to which chance and choice have
determined particular citizens’ outcomes. I linger at some length upon practical means of
disentangling these intermingling “inputs” to citizens’ “wealth functions” in the first of
the present Article’s two companion pieces.201 That Article is devoted to working out a
consistent set of political-ethical, legal and psychological foundations, consonant with
American tradition, for a comprehensive American “ownership society.” For present
purposes, however, it will do simply to recall what we reminded ourselves of just above
at II.C – that (a) the younger the prospective beneficiary of an ownership-spreading
program, (b) the less well endowed that beneficiary already is, and (c) the more readily
viewed as an “ethically exogenous resource” or “material opportunity” – upon which the
beneficiary must expend effort in order to transform it into personally experienced
“utility” – a spread item is, the easier it is to perceive publicly augmented spreading as a
redress of ill-fortune, as vindicating equal opportunity rather than simply giving “handouts.” And that is all the more so when public augmentation takes the form of tax
breaks.202

200

See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 2 at 29-56 for support. That is where I endeavor
to locate and overlapping consensus among our dominant political traditions – a consensus that converges
upon a shared ideal I label that of an “efficient equal-opportunity republic.” See also Hockett, Global
Macro-Hedging, supra note 17 at 142-73; and Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A
Meta-Theory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005). The “self-evidence” remark, of course, alludes
to THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America, in General
Congress Assembled, July 4, 1776, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 19 (Martin E. Segal ed.,
1984).
201

See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 2 at 36-51.

202

See Part II.C, supra.
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In that light, it would seem that we might try yet another variation on the ESOP,
this one geared toward benefiting those in particular who are young, lacking in resources,
or good citizens who play by the rules. (We might begin by targeting those who benefit
their country through military, AmeriCorps, or similar service.203) We can readily ensure
that beneficiaries meet these criteria – criteria which will reflect and in effect define the
form of patronage that we believe ethically to underwrite the benefit.204 And we can
financially structure the arrangement so as to ensure that beneficiaries benefit only by
working, rather as happens in the case of the ESOP. Here is how:
First, establish a national trust, a sort of cross between the national Social Security
trust and the humbler ESOP trust described at Part II. We might call this trust something
like, say, the national “Citizen Stock Ownership Plan” or “CitSOP” Trust. Second, open
individual “citizen trusts” or “-accounts” for every citizen – perhaps upon each citizen’s
reaching adulthood (in the “accounts” case), or perhaps at birth (in the “trusts” case) as
has recently been begun in the U.K.205 These individual “CitSOP” accounts could be
administered rather as was envisaged in connection with the “USA” accounts proposed in
the late 1990s, or the Social Security “personal accounts” proposed somewhat more
recently.206

203

Our first large-scale post-Homesteading era education-spreading programs began with veterans
as beneficiaries. Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5 at 144-46.
204

Note that we do this already with federal home finance and higher education assistance. We
employ both financial need criteria and law-abidingness criteria. See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra
note 5 at 97.
205

I refer to Prime Minister Blair’s Child Trust Fund – or more popularly, “baby bonds” – plan
implemented in 2001. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1297324.stm. Former Senator Bob
Kerrey of Nebraska proposed something similar States’-side at the turn of the past century. His were called
“KidSave Accounts.” See http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=2372&kaid=131&subid=207.
206

President Clinton proposed “universal savings accounts,” or “USA”s, in 1999. A similar
structure of private accounts, now without government income support, figured into George W. Bush’s
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Now, let the national CitSOP Trust borrow from lending institutions just as firms’
ESOP trusts do, and let them use the proceeds of the loans to purchase newly issued,
dividend-yielding common stock from firms. Grant participating firms and lending
institutions, in turn, more or less the same tax incentives as they are afforded in
connection with ESOP arrangements. Let the national CitSOP trust, in turn, pledge the
purchased stock as collateral207 and steadily pay down the debts to the lenders out of, say,
the tax revenue brought in from participating firms. Let the full set of arrangements, in
short, look like this:

2005 “State of the Union” address. See, e.g., http://www.ici.org/issues/ret/arc-leg/99_pres_usas.html;
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19990414-3020.html;
http://www.urban.org/publications/309272.html;
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/usaccounts.pdf#search='usa%20accounts';
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/;
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/04/politics/main692991.shtml.
207

Though of course this also might be deemed unnecessary in view of the full faith and credit
enjoyed by a federal institution. Indeed, even were the trust to function as a government sponsored entity
(a GSE), it would in effect be viewed as being fully 80% as credit-worthy as the federal government itself
for purposes of bank capital adequacy regulation. See 12 CFR Pt. 3, App.A.
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Figure 4: Institutional/Financial Structure of a CitSOP Arrangement

Firms

Newly Issued
Common
Stock

Guaranty of
Trust Note

Dividends
$ Proceeds
$ Loan
Nat’l
CitSOP
Trust

Lending
Institutions
Promissory Note,
Stock as Collateral

Stock as Debt is
Paid Down

Timely Repayment

Individual
CitSOP
Accounts

Yes, it’s Figure 1 (or 2 or 3) again, save again with differing persons and entities
– apart from issuing firms and lenders – involved, once more in light of the distinct form
of patronage that we are rewarding. The only complications found here but not there (in
the ESOP, CuSOP and RentSOP cases) have to do with how precisely we decide to
define the salient patronage form. Hence, for example, if we begin with national service
of some sort as the salient patronage form, then the amount of stock released over time to
the individual beneficiary’s CitSOP account will track her hours or weeks or years of
service. If, on the other hand, law-abiding citizenship itself is the patronage category,

68

then stock amounts will rise simply with years of age – rather as one’s Social Security
benefit rises with time spent at work.
We might also, of course, stratify patronage subtypes in this case, such that lawabiding citizenship alone entitles the beneficiary to some basic minimum of stock
released per quarter, national service of one sort entitles her to some amount more,
national service of another sort entitles her to a yet larger increment more, and so on.
Finally, insofar as it is opportunity deficits that have activated our concern, we might –
but also might not – “needs test” one or more of the benefits here, perhaps applying a
graduated discount factor to entitled benefits as personal wealth rises.208
There are many variations and gradations we might consider and experiment with
in all of this. But the important points for present purposes are more fundamental in
nature: The first is that the basic model can perspicuously accommodate any form of
patronage – any form of deserving status such as might ethically warrant benefit conferral
– that we envisage. The second is that it can do so while enabling us to confer the benefit
in a manner that both (a) broadens firm-ownership, and (b) does so by means that respect
our core values and endowment sensibilities. That means that the model can be adapted
quite flexibly so as to maximize the number of people who benefit while both respecting
and indeed giving expression to the core values and sensibilities rehearsed above at II.C,
which account for our publicly favoring ESOPs, not to mention our home- and educationspreading programs.209
208

A limiting case, then, might be that of the offspring of wealthy families, who perhaps would
not qualify for any benefit of this particular (CitSOP) sort. It might, however, on the other hand be deemed
preferable not to needs test at all, on more or less the same political popularity grounds as ground SSI’s
abstention from needs testing.
209

More on the latter, again, infra, Part V.B.
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D. Portfolio-Diversifying “Meta” Stock Ownership Plans
One particular advantage enjoyed by the CitSOP idea that might not be enjoyed to
the same degree by the CuSOP and RentSOP ideas is the “automaticity” of the CitSOP’s
diversification of acquired stocks. If a broad variety of firms were to participate in the
CitSOP program, beneficiaries would perforce receive shares in a broad array of firms.
In the earlier-rehearsed CuSOP and RentSOP cases, by contrast, diversification would
ride upon more accidental factors – viz., the number of different corporate firms that the
particular beneficiary regularly patronized as customer (voluntarily, involuntarily or in
between), and the number of such rent-extracting firms in more or less close proximity to
which the beneficiary lived. That raises the question whether we might design yet one
more SOP-like or SOP-complementing arrangement, such as can facilitate optimal
diversification among all SOP beneficiaries irrespective of SOP-type. I think that we
can.
A variety of methods can be employed. I’ll model two very simple, exemplary
cases. The first model might be called that of the “SOP Mutual.” Various SOP trusts
would convey their primary issuer stock holdings to an intermediary, which in return
would convey shares in itself of equal value to the trusts.210 The intermediary (and now
“secondary issuer”) would be, in effect, a mutual fund whose (initial) members were SOP

210

Fund shares would be valued as are any mutual fund’s shares. Individual issuer shares would
be valued as are any issuer’s – by “the market” in the case of publicly valued firms, pursuant to the
“cashflow” method in the case of closely held firms. See generally TOM COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION:
MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 131-297 (3d ed., 2000). I ignore here the question
of means of avoiding imprecisions occasioned by market fluctuations, accounting indeterminacies, etc., as
there seem to be no difficulties specific to the present case and not already dealt with by familiar means in
other investment company contexts.
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trusts.211 Subsequently the SOP trusts would, rather than gradually releasing sponsoring
issuers’ securities to their beneficiaries’ individual accounts over time, release SOP
Mutual shares instead. And shares of the latter sort also would serve, where shares
collateralize loans used for the purchase of primary issuer stock, in place of the latter as
collateral. Diagramatically, then, things would look thus:

211

And, as we’ll see in a moment, SOP trust beneficiaries.
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Figure 5: Institutional/Financial Structure of a SOP with SOP Mutual Arrangement
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It seems worth noting here that the SOP Trusts participating in SOP Mutual
arrangements could be of all types – ESOPs, CuSOPs, RentSOPs, even CitSOPs were
there good reason.212 And the more SOP types and SOPs, of course, the greater the

212

For example, were an insufficient variety of firm types participating in CitSOP arrangements.
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degree of diversity, hence the lesser quantum of value at risk, that would be faced by our
SOP beneficiaries. We might then have here a bit of the “best of both worlds,” so to
speak. We would be both fostering patronage relations between persons and firms –
since benefits ride upon such relations – and dissipating the income-risk that attends
patronage-concentration.
An advantage of the SOP Mutual model is that it enables SOP beneficiaries – not
to mention such lenders as whose loans are collateralized by SOP Trust-held stocks – to
reap the benefits of diversification even before they become legal as distinguished from
beneficial owners. If, however, we found that we had or we wished to forgo that
advantage for some reason, we could mutualize at the individual beneficiary level rather
than at the SOP Trust level. We might, for example, condition beneficiaries’ qualifying
for the SOP benefit upon their agreement to diversify their holdings for some period of
time. Or we might differently tax gains upon individually owned primary issues and
secondary (mutual) stock. Or, what seems more likely, a gradually growing degree of
financial understanding enjoyed by citizens holding gradually growing portfolios of
securities213 would of itself prompt our SOP beneficiaries to diversify their legally owned
holdings. (We might even provide or “incentivize” the provision of such counseling.)
In any event, diagrammatically things would look rather as they do in Figure 5,
save that now arrows would link, not SOP Trusts and SOP Mutuals, but individual SOP
beneficiaries and ordinary mutual funds:

213

We might even subsidize or require – the latter perhaps in the form of benefit conditionality –
some baseline degree of financial counseling, as we do in the case of our federal home- and educationfinance programs. See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5 at 112, 151.
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Figure 6: Institutional/Financial Structure of a SOP with Arrangement with
Diversification Achieved Privately
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And we might imagine, of course, ordinary mutual funds serving both in their current
capacities and as SOP Mutuals:
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Figure 7: Institutional/Financial Structure of a SOP with SOP Mutual Arrangement
and Privately Achieved Diversification as Well
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There seems no reason, then, why we might not achieve optimal diversification among
our growingly owning citizens even while rewarding their multiple ongoing patronage
relations with a perhaps somewhat lesser variety of firms.

75

V. ADVANCING ALONG THE CREDIT DIMENSION: FULL FAITH & CREDIT,
SECURITIZATION, AND “CAPITAL MORTGAGING”
Part IV showed how far we might travel simply by generalizing from the ESOP
along what we called the “patronage dimension.” Even by doing nothing more than
varying patronage forms – moving outward from mere labor patronage to other bases of
benefit warrant – we can both (a) get much more stock into many more hands, and (b) get
more diversified portfolios of that stock into those hands. And we can engage in this kind
of “ownership society”-expansion in a manner entirely consonant with our core values
and endowment sensibilities, just as the leveraged ESOP itself does.
Promising as all of that might be, however, we can actually do better still. For the
ESOP, we saw, is needlessly unambitious not only in respect of the patronage form that it
contemplates. It is also quite needlessly humble in respect of the credit form that it
employs. In this Part we turn to that second “dimension,” the credit dimension. First I
briefly take stock of the limitations that inhere in the ESOP’s reliance upon tax breaks
and individual firm credit alone. Then I sketch how the asset types that our incomplete
“ownership society” already spreads much more widely than firm-shares – houses and
higher educations – are spread much more widely precisely because we use beneficiary
credit augmented by public credit-backed credit insurance and securitization. Finally I
sketch how that latter strategy – which continues, like all of the SOPs, to respect the core
values and endowment sensibilities discussed at II.C – might be extended to sharespreading.
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A. Inherent Limitations on Tax Breaks & SOP-Sponsors’ Credit
Recall first how the leveraged SOP spreads firm shares among patrons: By
trimming its tax-take from both firms and lending institutions, the government
encourages individual firms in effect to finance themselves with debt, while issuing new
shares in the debt amount to trusts that are run on behalf of beneficiaries. That was one
upshot of II.A, II.B and IV, above. But this means that there are two inherent limitations
– a two-beamed ceiling, so to speak – upon SOP share-spreading even among any SOP’s
already limited class of beneficiary-patrons.
First, insofar as the tax breaks are essential inducements to the lending and shareconveying transactions that constitute the SOP transaction, share-spreading is limited by
the amount of the government’s tax-take that remains to be cut. Once all the clothing is
shed, so to speak, there is no way to cool oneself further without changing the external
temperature. That opens the question whether there might be some means, still consistent
with our core values and endowment sensibilities as briefly rehearsed at II.C, by which to
turn on the fan or the air conditioner, so to speak. Might we lower not only the
temperature as maintained by ourselves (our warm clothing), but also as maintained by
external forces (the surrounding air)? Might we facilitate more share-spreading by not
simply conditionally refraining from taking, but perhaps more affirmatively by assisting
in the prevention of chance – of randomly distributed loan defaults – from so taking?
Second, insofar as (tax-cut-enhanced) individual firm credit-worthiness in the eye
of the private lender is an essential predicate to leveraged SOP share-spreading, which
II.B and II.C showed us it is, then share-spreading is also inherently limited by individual
firm credit-worthiness. The amount that the SOP trust can borrow to finance its share-
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purchases is determined by the credit-worthiness of its guarantor, the SOP-sponsoring
firm. But this means that the lender in any leveraged SOP transaction sees the risk of
default concentrated upon a single firm – the SOP trust sponsor. And that in turn means,
for reasons familiar from the economics of insurance, that less credit than might have
been forthcoming will ultimately be forthcoming.214
This then opens the question whether there might be some means, again
consistent with our core values and endowment dispositions as briefly rehearsed at II.C,
by which to boost credit simply by facilitating the spread of default risk over more parties
than singular sponsoring firms and their lenders alone. Might we facilitate more sharespreading through risk-spreading – that is, by not simply rendering borrowing firms more
credit-worthy through tax-cutting, but perhaps by facilitating the development of both
primary and secondary (i.e., securitized or monetized) loan default insurance markets?
B. Publicly Augmented Credit: Our Present Day Home- & Higher EducationSpreading as Prototypes
If our experience with home-spreading and education-spreading is any guide, then
the answer to our last two questions is “yes.” For public credit-enhancement and
securitization are precisely the strategies that we have employed in constructing the two
legs upon which our incomplete “ownership society” currently stands. Here I recount
matters briefly, as the fuller treatment can be found in the second of this Article’s
companion pieces.215
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See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 2 at 87-98, and Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging,
supra note 17 at 183-203 for more on the relevant financial and insurance economics principles. See also
infra, V.B.
215

Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5 at 104-20, 146-53.
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1. Home-Finance
First, homes: Early in the 20th Century as now, most who purchased nonagricultural, purely residential real estate did so partly on credit. What was different was
that fewer, for that reason, purchased housing at all. Housing credit markets were more
fragmented, mortgages in consequence less liquid investments than they are today.
Home loans in consequence were extended for much briefer terms – generally two to
three years – at the end of which they “ballooned” to coming due in full. Loan-to-value
ratios, in turn, were very low by modern standards. As little as fifty percent was
considered high, and was rare. Financing on such terms fell far short of most would-be
buyers’ capacities; and so second mortgages, junior liens, and rollover refinancings were
the norm.
When real estate prices leveled off, then fell in 1928, short-term mortgages no
longer could be refinanced in full. Resultant forced sales and foreclosures, which
reached the rate of over 1,000 per day once some 50% of all home mortgages in the
country had gone into default, brought prices even lower, pulling the real estate market
into a classic “downward spiral.”216
The programs instituted to address this crisis, begun in the last year of the Hoover
administration, broadened through the Roosevelt years and continuing in but minimally
altered form today, cannot fail to impress in their innovativeness and comprehensiveness.
The process began with the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLBA) of 1932,217 which

216

Milton P. Semer et al., Evolution of Federal Legislative Policy in Housing: Housing Credits,
in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 39, 41 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1986).
217

12 USCS § 601 et seq.
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authorized establishment of a system of Regional Federal Home Loan Banks roughly
parallel to that of the Federal Reserve’s system of Regional Federal Reserve Banks. The
Regional Banks provided standards and supervision to member institutions – the private
mutual savings banks (MSBs) then responsible for most mortgage lending – and in return
supplied added lines of credit on the security of the mortgage loans that they held (thus
“monetizing” those mortgages).
The new Congress that took office in 1933 built upon Hoover’s well designed
initiative, first with a Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA) in 1933,218 which provided for
refinancing loans on favorable terms to enable erstwhile home-owners to recover their
homes, and for the spread of further MSBs by directly affording national charters. One
year later, the National Housing Act (NHA) of 1934219 afforded a system of deposit
insurance for the MSBs analogous to that newly instituted for depositors in commercial
banks, boosting the availability of lendable deposits. More critically, the NHA instituted
a system of insurance for the MSBs themselves, against defaulting mortgagors: Section
203 of the Act provided for a nationwide “mutual mortgage insurance system” through
which the newly created Federal Housing Administration (FHA) could insure first
mortgage loans made for the construction, purchase, or refinancing of one-to-four
bedroom family homes.
The FHA insurance scheme fundamentally altered the régime of home-financing
in the US. It effectively replaced traditional collateralization requirements with national
default-risk-pooling. The uniform requirements upon which FHA conditioned its
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12 USCS § 1464 et seq.
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48 Stat. 1246, June 27, 1934.
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insurance fostered development of a standardized home mortgage instrument marketable
throughout the country; that opened the door to securitization hence fuller risk-pooling,
more on which presently. The housing quality requirements upon which FHA
conditioned its insurance also ensured the financial rationality of federally facilitated
home-finance investments. And FHA’s requirements of (a) actuarial soundness, and (b)
risk classifying and separate pooling ensured that the system retained the traditional
efficiencies of a private insurance market.
Congress effectively completed its ad hoc discovery of “the Method” of
financially engineered ownership-spreading in 1938, by chartering the first modern
“government sponsored enterprise” (or “GSE”): The Federal National Mortgage
Association – FNMA, or “Fannie Mae” – was charged with making a national market in
FHA-insured mortgage instruments themselves, i.e., with “securitizing” those mortgages.
In effect, Fannie Mae along with later progeny (Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac) closed the
proverbial circle, separately completing the markets for housing credit and credit-riskbearing, thereby maximizing the availability of such credit to home-buyers in the manner
described earlier. Fannie Mae proved sufficiently successful, even on market terms, to
privatize in 1968. It now offers a multitude of home finance services.220
We can summarize the foregoing paragraphs in yet another diagram, the basic
institutional-cum-financial structure of which remains intact to this day:
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See http://www.fanniemae.org.
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Figure 8: Home-Financing Structure Since Federal Home-Ownership Legislation of
the 1930s
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Finance Board, HUD and FDIC, respectively; but the home-finance structure
mapped here itself remains intact.
2. Education-Finance
Now “human capital”: Federal involvement in higher education finance, in this
case since the later 1950s and, especially, the middle 1960s, has substantially replicated
that in home-finance. Once again, a perceived crisis – this time a 1957 Soviet satellite
launch – acted as impetus. Public perceptions of national security and confidence that
“we [were] number one” were badly shaken by the launch of Sputnik. Public discourse
accordingly turned quickly to the question of who, or what, was to blame.221
One principal culprit, as determined by Congress and President Eisenhower,
turned out to be substandard science and technical education. Congress reacted swiftly
by passing the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958.222 At the heart of
NDEA was the National Defense Student Loan (NDSL) program, which for the first time
(apart from the GI Bill223) offered long-term, low-interest loans broadly to Americans
seeking post-secondary education. The NDSL program, renamed the “National Direct
Student Loan” program in 1972, then the “Perkins Loan” program in 1987, continues
today, though subsequently established programs now account for more students and
dollars:
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See, e.g., PAUL DICKSON, SPUTNIK: THE SHOCK OF THE CENTURY (2001); also the interesting
archive of materials available at http://www.nytimes.com/partners/aol/special/sputnik/.
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20 USCS § 401 et seq.

223

The 1944 “GI Bill” had to a degree anticipated the NDEA, offering (rather more modest)
financial assistance to veterans seeking higher education immediately following the Second World War.
That too was consistent with “the Method” – in particular with its “conditioning” strategy.
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As the 1950s gave way to the early 1960s, federal involvement with higher
education spreading came to be described not simply in national defense, but in “great
society” terms. The first critical step came with the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of
1964,224 whereby Congress among other things established the Federal Work-Study
Program (FWSP), which like the NDSL program continues to the present day. FWSP’s
linking of education aid to work is significant in light of the constraints upon effective
asset-spreading catalogued above.
The EOA was but a beginning, however. The real milestone of the 1960s, which
stands to contemporary higher education finance much as the 1934 NHA stands to
contemporary home finance, came one year later with the Higher Education Act (HEA)
of 1965.225 The HEA forms the basis of current federal financial assistance programs for
seekers of higher education. It not only brought then existent programs under one
umbrella, but established critical new programs. Most important for our present purposes
was the federal Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) Program, now known as the Stafford
Loan Program.
As originally designed, the GSL Program offered one particularly salient benefit:
a federal guaranty of the debts incurred by those financing their post-secondary
educations through borrowing. The guaranty, of course, operated much as did federal
mortgage insurance after the passage of the NHA in 1934. It removed lender risk,
rendering loanable funds more readily available on cheaper terms.
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42 USCS § 2929 et seq.
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20 USCS § 1001 et seq.
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A particularly important augmentation of the GSL program’s credit-enhancing
effect came with Congress’s 1972 Amendments to the HEA:226 Those amendments
brought the Student Loan Marketing (SLM) Corporation, better known as “Sallie Mae,” a
GSE bearing distinct family resemblances to Fannie Mae. As its full name suggests,
Sallie Mae was chartered as a market-maker for shares in pooled student loan obligations.
Like Fannie Mae, that is, it was, and is, a securitizer. Also like Fannie Mae, Sallie Mae
only began as a GSE. Once the federal government had established the existence and
shown the long-term viability of the requisite secondary market, it gradually withdrew:
Sallie Mae began to privatize in 1997, then completed the process at the end of last year.
And like Fannie Mae, it now does much more than securitizing.227
Once again we can summarize the foregoing in a diagram. I trust that the identity
of institutional-cum-financial structure shared by both this Figure and Figure 8 will not
go unnoticed:
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Pub. L. 92-318, March 23, 1972.
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See, e.g., http://www2.salliemae.com/about.
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Figure 9: Higher Education Financing Structure Since Federal Higher Education
Finance Legislation of the 1960s, ‘70s & ‘90s
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and vary from state to state. There is, then, considerable functional and, indeed,
public/private status overlap among asterisked entities.
C. Stock-Finance: Adapting the Strategy to Share-Spreading
Call the publicly augmented private credit strategy shared by our home- and
education-finance programs “the Method of financial engineering.”228 The Method has
worked rather well in spreading the owning of homes and human capital over much,
though not yet all, of the citizenry of our “ownership society”-in-the-making.229 Might
we adapt it to spread shares in firms, our hypothesized analogue to the Homesteading
era’s productive land? Well, in Part IV we generalized from the ESOP to other SOPtypes, essentially by replicating the ESOP’s financial-relational structure while changing
some terms in the relation. Let’s try that strategy here.
Imagine, then, something like this: We begin with something a bit like the
CitSOP structure mapped earlier in Figure 5 above, save that we now add a layer:
Citizens have individual CitSOP accounts as they had there. But now, either instead of or
in addition to coming legally to own firm-shares as a national CitSOP trust pays down
debt used to purchase shares on behalf of participants, participants purchase shares
228

So I call it in Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 2 at 95-102, and Hockett, Hamiltonian
Means, supra note 5 at 87-153.
229

In connection with the “not yet all” caveat, note that higher education-finance and homefinance often will be of little use, to some of our citizens, absent access to nonhuman capital. For among
other things, we have seen at V.B that the Method itself works in essential conjunction with the
beneficiary’s earning income that enables her to amortize her publicly facilitated mortgage debt or student
debt. Yet ours, as we saw at III, is a world in which stochastic short-to-medium term “mismatch” between
productive investment and consumer demand, similar mismatch between technology-driven productivity
improvements and consumer demand, and global “outsourcing” all periodically slacken domestic demand
even for highly skilled labor – most Americans’ primary source of income, as we saw in effect at Part I. So
there must be, ultimately, a symbiosis among our three basic ownable capital types – homes, educations and
firm-shares – in an optimally functioning “ownership society” wrought by “the Method.” And that is once
again to say, in yet another way, that our completed “ownership society” will have to constitute a “threelegged stool.” We will do better even with homes and higher educations once we do better with firmshares.
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directly – just as they purchase homes and educations directly. We might imagine, for
example, the national CitSOP trust continuing to purchase shares enough to afford
citizens a basic minimum, or perhaps to reward such citizens as “serve their country”
through some form of national service. Then share-purchases above that threshold would
be direct purchases by citizens, as in the case of homes and educations.
Also as with homes and higher educations, citizens’ direct purchases of firmshares would be effected in part by their own borrowing. But again as in the case of
home and education finance, then, we would publicly facilitate the borrowing. We would
do so first by establishing, or fostering the private establishment of, a “capital mortgage”
insurer analogous to FHA in the home finance case.230 As in that case, of course,
mortgage insurance would lessen lender risk, thereby augmenting the pool of available
credit. The insurer also would operate along similar lines to those operated along by
FHA and the Federal Stafford Loan program: Quality conditions would be imposed upon
qualifying securities (and hence issuers themselves, of course231) just as they are upon
qualifying homes and institutions of higher learning. Likewise, credit-worthiness
conditions would have to be met by the borrowing citizens.232 As with home mortgages
and guaranteed student loans, these imposed conditionalities would, presumably, come
ultimately to be effectively “codified,” and thus standardized, in the form of a
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Or we might guarantee the loans, up to some amount, as in the higher education case.
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I’ll address “market distortion” objections that this might occasion infra, Part VI. (The same
objections might have been raised in connection with the quality conditions that we impose in the cases of
home- and higher education-finance, after all.)
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Another reason to require financial counseling, then, again as indeed we do in the case of
guaranteed student loans. See note 221, supra.
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standardized “capital mortgage” instrument. That in turn would pave the way for our
employing the second mode of public credit-augmentation:
We would publicly facilitate borrowing second by establishing, or fostering the
private establishment of, a secondary “capital mortgage” market-maker analogous to
Fannie Mae in the home finance case and Sallie Mae in the education finance case. Let
us (for now, and with some aesthetic regret) call it the “Capital Mortgage Marketing
Association,” or “Cappie Mae.” Cappie Mae would purchase “capital mortgage” debt
from primary lenders. Like Fannie Mae and Sallie Mae, it would pool and classify the
rights to repayment that are those debts in a special purpose vehicle, then issue shares in
the pool(s) – “capital mortgage-backed securities,” as it were. Also as in the case of
Fannie Mae and Sallie Mae, of course (for this is the very point), the making of a
secondary market in “capital mortgages” would facilitate the yet more efficient flow of
default risk to that risk’s most efficient bearers, ultimately thereby enhancing available
“capital mortgage” credit. (This, recall from V.B, is part of how “the Method” works.)
A possible alternative or supplement to “capital mortgage securitization” might be
“capital mortgage monetization.” The Fed might, for example, credit Member Bank
reserve accounts in some (discounted) amount in return for what “capital mortgage” debt
they hold, perhaps up to some limit – again as with the FHFB and home mortgage
debt.233 In effect, the Fed would be “credit-allocating” just as it and the FHFB do now
with home mortgage debt. It would be “incentivizing” the extension of “capital
mortgage” credit by Member Banks by purchasing – thus taking the risk attendant upon –
“capital mortgage” debt. This extension would not be as radical as might be supposed: It
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See supra, V.B.1 and Figure 8, by way of reminder in the home mortgage case.
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appears that the Fed’s discount window was originally fashioned with a cognate purpose
in view; and the window has occasionally been opened for precisely such a purpose in
cases of financially distressed firms and municipalities thought “too big to fail.”234 But I
shall assume for present purposes – realistically, I think – that the monetization option is
closed,235 and rest hope on “Cappie Mae.”
These credit-enhancement methods, familiar from the home- and educationfinance cases briefly rehearsed through V.B, could be readily combined with the taxbreak strategies rehearsed through Parts II and IV in connection with ESOPs and other
SOPs. Tax incentives also facilitate the home- and education-finance programs
themselves, after all.236 These methods also could be supplemented, as suggested at
IV.C, with more direct benefit-conferrals in the case of constituencies whom we find
worthy of special solicitude, either because they are faultlessly under-endowed or
234
See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 13, 38 Stat. 251, 263–64 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 USCS). Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act provides for the “discount window”
through which the Federal Reserve may “monetize” payables (primarily commercial paper, referred to as
“eligible” paper in the Act) of participating depository institutions (technically, the latter serve as collateral
for Federal Reserve lending to participating institutions), in effect trading liquidity for assets in a manner
analogous to secondary markets’ “securitizing” payment obligations. Although the section 13 discount
window was originally envisaged for that purpose—in effect, to facilitate and incentivize small business
lending by local banks by offering the latter quick means of monetizing the resultant debts owed them—it
has seldom been so used. Instead, it is primarily government (generally U.S. government, though in some
cases other government) debt that is monetized by discounting. The principal nongovernmental debtmonetizing uses have been pursuant to large “bailout” packages assembled or proposed for institutions—
generally banking institutions, but occasionally nonbank institutions—thought to be “too big to [allow] to
fail.” See, e.g., Frederick S. Carns, A Two-window System for Banking Reform, FDIC BANKING REV., June
1995, at n.37, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ analytical/banking/1995sprg/rbr1a1ft.html#2; David Fettig,
Lender of More than Last Resort, REGION, Dec. 2002, http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/pubs/region/0212/lender.cfm; A&M-Commerce Department of Economics and Finance, Course 572 Dale Funderburk,
http://www.tamucommerce.edu/ ecofin/courses/funderburk/572/yesf.txt (last visited Dec. 26, 2005). The
explanation seems to be that the First World War and consequent rapid national debt growth and national
industrialization quickly preempted what was originally envisaged as the window’s more localized business
debt-monetizing purpose. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., A PRIMER ON MONEY 42–43, 69–71 (Subcomm. Print 1964); G.
EDWARD GRIFFIN, THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND: A SECOND LOOK AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE (3d
ed. 1998); Norman G. Kurland, The Federal Reserve Discount Window, Center for Economic and Social
Justice, http://www.cesj.org/homestead/reforms/moneycredit/discountwindow.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2005).
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See supra, note 234, for why.
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See Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra note 5 at 93, 115-16, 149.
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because they have “gone above and beyond” by performing some manner of national
service. Here too there is precedent in the home- and education-finance cases, wherein
we do more than just enhance credit-availability for some constituencies: In those latter
cases, we actually subsidize interest payments on the debts; and sometimes we even
relieve them.237
Again, as with the new SOP forms proposed at Part IV, it is not to our purpose to
blueprint in every detail a single preferred program or cluster of programs. The point
here is simply to schematize, suggestively in broad outline. It is to show just how readily
we might extend the basic strategies that we already employ, from the cases in which we
do employ them to the one case in which we as yet do not. Accordingly, then, we might
summarize our results here in just one more diagram:

237

Id.
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Figure 10: General Form of Prospective CitSOP Arrangement with “Capital
Mortgage” Insurance and Securitization/Monetization
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even initially be associated with the Fed, but also might ultimately be privatized.
Likewise “Cappie Mae.”
Of course there are potential challenges that might stand in the way of
implementing any publicly augmented private “capital mortgage” credit enhancement
program. Some such challenges might be more poignant than their analogues in the
home- and education-finance cases, though there also appear to be mitigating factors that
operate more effectively in the firm-share-finance than in the home- and educationfinance cases as well. We will do best to consider these together in a separate Part, to
which I now turn.
VI. ANTICIPATED DIFFICULTIES & OBJECTIONS
Adapting the full credit-enhancement strategy, originally developed in the homeand higher education-finance contexts, to spread non-human capital would be publicly to
facilitate the private extension of credit for citizen purchases of firm-shares. In effect,
collectively supported private credit-risk-pooling hence credit (and thus, expected future
capital) would stand in for already accumulated capital (collateral), again as in the cases
of contemporary home- and higher education-finance. That in turn would enable more
people to become owners in this realm just as more have become owners of homes and
human capital. Citizens faultlessly lacking in non-human capital would be enabled, by
exercising reasonable diligence, to acquire it, just as they now are with homes and
educations. And they would be so enabled at minimal-to-no perceived cost to those
already owning these assets. So public action here, as in the home and higher education
cases and as in the ESOP case, would seem to conform to the values and endowment
dispositions rehearsed at II.C.
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Yet none of this is to say that matters here are easy. There are challenges and
potential objections that we can anticipate and ought to address. In some cases these are
more poignant here than they were in the home, education and ESOP realms. In other
cases they are less so. Let’s take them in ascending order of difficulty:
A “Market Distortion”
One challenge is that, in order to ensure the actuarial soundness of any “capital
mortgage finance” (“CMF”) program, we shall have to impose quality conditions upon
the underlying assets (hence by extension the suppliers thereof) whose acquisition we are
facilitating. That, as seen at V.B, is a key feature of “the Method” as applied to homeand higher education-finance. And it appears to be a critical factor in those programs’
actuarial hence political successes. But imposing such standards in the case of CMF
might look like public favoring of some firms, or kinds of firms, or kinds of investments,
over others. And that perceived “favoritism,” “distortion,” or “inappropriate
intermingling of politics and investment” is of a kind we traditionally have disavowed, at
least rhetorically.238
This challenge is easily met so long as it is first acknowledged. Note first that all
public interventions in the economy, whether packaged as facilitative or as regulatory,
inevitably affect some firms or industries differently than others. The home finance
programs afforded stimulus to the housing industry and thereby “distorted” the
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This was a key factor, for example, in Fed Chairman Greenspan’s and others’ opposition to
then President Clinton’s proposals, in 1999 and 2000, to invest then government surpluses in the stock
market for the benefit of Social Security solvency. See, e.g., Amy Goldstein & Steven Mufson, Greenspan
Wary of Market Role in Social Security Rescue, WASHINGTON POST, January 21, 1999, at A1; Carolyn
Lochhead, Skepticism Over Plan for Social Security: Greenspan, Analysts Fear Clinton Proposal Won’t Do
Job, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, January 21, 1999, at A1; Fred E. Foldvary, Keep Government Out of the
Stock Market, THE PROGRESS REPORT, 1999, at http://www.progress.org/archive/fold75.html.
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macroeconomy. (They did not, for example, stimulate the rental market. Quite the
contrary.239) The education finance programs did the same in respect of higher education
and the macroeconomy. (They did not, for example, stimulate the market for
apprenticeships.)
More generally, contract law “distorts” persons’ capacities to breach agreements,
tort law their capacities to work what we consider unjust injury to others, property law
their capacities to engage in what we consider illegitimate taking from others. Laws
against murder “distort” the contract killing market. And so on. The question, then, is
not whether the public should “distort” what “would” have been the workings of
“natural” markets “absent government intervention.”240 The question, rather, is how, in
what forms and to what degrees it should or should not permit its actions to affect them.
Note second, by way of answering what one suspects would be most peoples’
answer to that last question, that we would not have to evaluate individual businesses or
business plans in any micro-managerial sense by requiring that ownership shares
acquired by citizens through CMF meet minimum quality standards. Rather, the
requirement can be simply that the shares be “investment grade,” per existing bank
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The choice to favor home-ownership as primary American domiciliary mode was forthrightly a
choice not to favor rental or leasing. See, e.g., J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Federal Policy:
Encouraging Homeownership, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT, supra
note 216, at 331.
240

Indeed it is absurd to suggest that “markets” as we define and celebrate them could so much as
exist absent public facilitation via bodies of law such as those just mentioned. This has been a truism at
least since the time of David Hume and Adam Smith. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, 2 A TREATISE ON HUMAN
NATURE 293 (T.H. Greene & T.H. Grose eds., 1890) (three “fundamental laws” requisite not only to the
preservation of markets, but of society itself – “that of stability of possession, of its transference by consent
and of the performance of promises”); ADAM SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 213-338 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976) (On necessity of public maintenance of
institutions providing for the common defense, dispensation of justice (law), commercial marketplaces and
general education if society is to attain to opulence, or indeed even to endure at all as a society).
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capital adequacy regulation241 and as determined by reputational intermediaries such as
Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s.
Alternatively, facilitated investments might be required, in toto per personal
portfolio, to yield returns that are subject to no more than some stipulated variance, hence
to be diversified.242 Or facilitated investments can be required to be made partly in broad
market index funds. In that case all (or at any rate all publicly listed) firms would benefit
from new investment in proportion as they already have grown; and the investments in
turn would be no more risky than the market as a whole. In all such cases “quality” of
the sort that concerns us will have been reasonably assured. And any “distortion” of the
sort that might reasonably concern us will have been minimized if not indeed virtually
eliminated.243
It might be objected that public credit-facilitation involving the aforementioned
forms of quality-assurance will tend, nevertheless, disproportionately to benefit well
established, even stodgy firms over smaller, more innovative, high growth (and high risk)
firms. Won’t that taint the CMF program with an inherently conservative bias?
This is hardly a problem. Note first that we want to be conservative about the
reliability of the assets that our “ownership society” spreads, including shares in firms.
241

See 12 CFR Pt. 3, App.A.
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It is of course well established that as few as nine or ten separate securities can diversify away
upward of 90% of idiosyncratic risk. See, classically, Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77
(1952). See generally HARRY MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS 52 (1959). See also James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk, 25 REV.
ECON. STUD. 25 (1958).
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Id. See also BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 255 (3rd ed., 2004).
On the other hand, of course, the index fund strategy might cut against the participation values held by
Civic Republican advocates of an “ownership society,” as discussed supra Part I.B. We might mitigate that
problem, if we perceived it thus, by requiring the facilitated investments to be made in funds organized as
corporations, in which shareholders held governance rights, rather than as trusts in which they were
protected only by fiduciary rights.
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We want those stakes, ideally, to be as enduring and reliable as are homes and good
educations themselves. Note, second, that there is no reason to think that assuring that
reliability will dry up the financing of smaller, high end, more risky and innovative
ventures. Those ventures generally seek, and receive, their financing from institutions
and markets quite apart from depository institutions – indeed even apart from the larger
established stock exchanges – in any event.244 And their financiers are, of course,
typically more risk-preferring than the typical stock market participant.
Credit for new share-acquisitions by those who are currently capitaldisenfranchised would be expected to come from the more risk-averse. It would come,
that is, from those not expecting to receive extravagant returns from their investments
(the loans they extend), but willing to accept lower returns in exchange for the preferred
safety of direct or indirect public guaranty. It would not, then, be likely significantly to
cut into the financing of innovative new firms.
B. “Subsidized Speculation”
A second general challenge that a CMF program might face is the avoidance of
publicly facilitating “mere speculation.” The line between that and bona fide
“investment” is of course notoriously difficult to draw at the margin. And even “pure
speculation,” it is widely observed, is generally beneficial; it diminishes price-spreads
and with them inefficiencies wrought by mere ignorance. But we would nevertheless
presumably not wish to subsidize or otherwise facilitate unambiguously “casino-like”
behavior among newly “capitally-empowered” novice investors – herdlike behavior of
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See, e.g., HENRY ENGLER & JAMES ESSINGER, THE FUTURE OF BANKING 3-70 (2000); HENDRIK
S. HOUTHAKKER & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 48-109 (1996).
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the sort widely believed to have been a precipitating cause of the 1929 stock market crash
and ensuing depression. And isn’t that, some might protest, what facilitating the
leveraged purchase of firm-shares by the erstwhile capitally disenfranchised would be?
Relatedly, mightn’t publicly augmented leveraged stock-acquisition result in inflation of
stock-prices, even a “bubble?”
Like the “distortion” charge, this is not an especially difficult challenge to meet.
Here, though, our answer is more practical than theoretical: First, the imposition of
quality standards per the preceding paragraphs will itself significantly dampen any
lottery-ticket-like nature of qualifying credit-facilitated investment. Second, even were
that, improbably, not to suffice, it would seem easy enough simply to place direct
limitations, pursuant to the conditions that we attach to the benefit of public credit
facilitation, upon the velocity at which purchased shares can be turned over. This would
of course be analogous to the tax penalties incurred by early withdrawal of funds from an
IRA. We might, for example, facilitate the extension of less credit at some time tn to any
beneficiary who buys and sells at too rapid a rate at time tn-1. Or we might impose
transaction excises – “Tobin taxes” – upon such behavior, all proceeds to return to the
public fisc.245
Third, in respect of the “bubble” objection, note that the same objection could
have been leveled in connection with home-mortgage debt-augmentation, and with higher
education credit-enhancement. Yet inflation in these realms has not proved intractable.
Moreover, note that in the case of firm-shares the purchases, at least if quality-
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conditioned as suggested at VI.A and modulated in the ways suggested in the previous
paragraph, will tend to finance productivity-growth on the part of firms. That means that
public action here can be expected to be counterinflationary in the goods markets in a
way that it is not even in the home and higher education markets. Again, then, there are
multiple reasons to expect, and options by which to ensure, the investment-like as
distinguished from the “merely speculative” nature of the widening business-shareownership that we facilitate.
C. “Cost Recovery”
A third challenge is cognate with, though perhaps initially somewhat more
difficult than, the quality-standard and speculation-dampening challenges: It is that of
how best to ensure that credit-purchased firm-shares will yield discounted long-run
returns in excess of their financing costs.246 In the case of homes and higher education,
such yield is empirically well established, and there is no reason to expect that too change
in the foreseeable future.247 Would it be the same for stocks?
The answer, at least over the long run, appears to be “yes.” For one thing, the
American (and indeed much of the global) equities market as a whole has tended toward
an 8-11% rate of return since records have been kept; lending rates have been
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substantially lower than that over the same period.248 For another thing, even were that
not the case, we could simply consider, as a corollary to our quality standards, stipulating
that only substantial dividend-yielding stock would qualify for CH facilitation. We could
even consider going yet further: We might prohibit, say, the financing of new projects by
publicly listed firms with retained earnings.249 That would, first, free-up funds for
dividends – potentially enhancing real incomes and discouraging excessive speculation in
shares.250 And it would, second, render management more reliant upon hence
accountable to outside finance – thus upon and to a broader swathe of our citizenry once
financing began to originate from the newly CMF-capitally-enfranchised – than in recent
decades has been the case.
Requiring dividend-payments as a matter of federal law would of course
constitute a marked change in our present-day corporate governance regime, a realm
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commonly observed to be left, primarily and quite properly, to the states.251 But we need
not advocate anything so radical at present. It suffices simply to remind ourselves that it
might be considered should we decide to get serious about share-spreading. Regular
dividend payments and reliance upon outside financing used to be much more common,
after all.252 And in all events most such firms as might be affected by any such change –
the well established firms, per our quality concerns discussed at VI.A – already are
federally regulated as to many formerly state-regulated governance matters: That is of
course by dint of the federal securities laws, under whose jurisdiction most of these firms
fall in virtue of being publicly listed and held.253
But what about competition with our would-be CMF program beneficiaries, in
that case (and indeed in any case), from large financial intermediaries? If we act to
induce greater reliance by firms upon outside financing (or even if we do not), and there’s
a spread between prevailing interest rates and returns to equity investment as per the
second paragraph of this Subpart, won’t lenders simply purchase the equities directly
rather than lending to individuals who turn out to be publicly underwritten arbitrageurs?
This objection is fair enough as a matter of theory, but readily dispatched as a
matter of practice. Even ignoring the portfolio-shaping and capital adequacy rules, noted
above, to which we subject our financial institutions,254 it is easy enough to ensure that
only presently capitally disenfranchised citizens enjoy the benefit of a CMF program:
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Simply limit the publicly facilitated CMF insurance and securitization to “capital
mortgages” entered into by individual citizens, and only up to a stipulated borrowing
amount. Home mortgage insurance and securitization under our home finance programs
are limited thus, after all; they’re available only for the purchase of first homes. Neither
financial institutions nor plutocrats buy homes under the program.
Once again, then, a potential objection to CMF bears an analogue in the homefinance case, the education-finance case, or both. And once again means employed to
head off the objection in those cases are readily extended to the present case. Only our
final general challenge seems less readily addressed by a home- or education-finance
analogue:
D. “Subsidized Indolence”
The fourth and perhaps most important general challenge faced by a prospective
CMF program comes through our observation at Part II.C, concerning perceived
“earning” or “deservingness.” In the case of our higher education-finance programs, we
saw at V.B.2, beneficiaries of “the Method” must diligently labor to enjoy the benefit:
They must study, learn, and earn their degrees, then work to pay off their student debt. In
the case of our home-finance programs, we saw at V.B.1, beneficiaries of “the Method”
must generally labor to make timely mortgage payments from their wages or salaries.
And things are likewise, we saw at II.A, in the case of ESOPs. Is there a counterpart in
the case of firm-shares spread via CMF?
The answer, again, is “yes,” but we must make it a careful “yes.” To begin with,
“capital mortgages” can be expected in most instances to be like home mortgages:
Beneficiaries of federally facilitated “capital mortgage” insurance and securitization will
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in most cases, presumably, work to pay their “capital mortgage” debt as surely as they do
to pay their home mortgage debt.255 It might happen that their doing so gradually reduces
the hours that they have to work, as dividends and/or capital gains accruing to their stockholdings gradually supplement, then perhaps partly supplant, labor income. And indeed
this is even to be hoped, since the reduction of dependency and the spread of material
freedom is part of the very point of seeking an “ownership society.”256 But there is no
reason to anticipate that people will simply cease working or otherwise diligently acting
altogether. And that is particularly so over the time that is pertinent to the constraints
imposed by our endowment sensibilities rehearsed at II.C – viz., the time during which
beneficiaries must pay down their “capital mortgages.” There are several reasons:
For one thing, consumer demand of course tends to grow with income and wealth,
even if at a diminishing rate;257 and thus does the perceived need to work continue,
particularly in a world that does not yet allow for shortened working hours.258 For
another thing, even were consumer demand not to rise in response to rises in income and
wealth wrought by a successful CMF program, those latter rises, in so far as they are,
after all, partly offset by interest payments that must be made pursuant to the “capital
mortgages,” are unlikely to render employment unnecessary during one’s youth and early
255
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middle age.259 Finally, even to the degree that rising wealth would allow for less need of
employment, it could be expected to encourage more people simply to start their own
businesses, or to engage in productive behavior chosen on grounds other than desperate
need, rather than simply to cease being productive.260 That appears to be the trend, in any
event, among such few “early retirees” as we find already today.261 So it seems highly
doubtful that an actuarially successful CMF program would have to offend our
endowment dispositions by appearing to be unearned or rewarding of indolence.
Note further that, in the case of “capital mortgages” benefiting the chronically
under-employed, at least where that state is attributable to obvious ethically exogenous
disadvantage such as physical or mental handicap or poor social circumstances, we are as
a society more open to more direct subsidy in any event. That too owes to our core
values as adumbrated at Part II.C.262 This is how we find things in the home- and
education-spreading realms, at any rate – where, recall, interest is directly subsidized
rather than just indirectly lowered (through default insurance or guaranty) for the less
well-to-do.263
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Note, finally, that there is nothing to prevent our substituting other opportunities
to work diligently in place of missing employment – as a condition attaching to the CMF
subsidy. In effect we have suggested this already at IV.C, above, in connection with
CitSOPs. We can, then, simply require that beneficiaries donate hours to Vista or
Americorps. Or if need be we can establish additional public service corps for which
otherwise unemployed beneficiaries of “capital mortgage” assistance will be required to
work to the best of their apparent abilities in exchange for the benefit. Such corps would
serve as useful domestic analogues to military service, which as we have noted already
constitutes a primary mode of public service qualifying otherwise unemployed citizens to
receive much in the way of home-finance, education-finance and health care
assistance.264 Again, there are multiple possibilities here, and we can do little more in the
present Article than speak broadly. But the time, nevertheless, is more than ripe for
beginning to sketch seriously, in broad outline, our preliminary designs.
CONCLUSION: HOPES & NEXT STEPS
We have come a long way since the Introduction. But of course more remains to
be done. For this Article, in a sense, has amounted to little more than a sustained
thought-experiment: We have sought to think-through just what analogical extensions,
from already-familiar and well-running programs, are possible – and might draw us
closer to completing that “ownership society” we wish to become. But what to do next,
once we’ve experimented in thought?
Our next step, I think, is to experiment beyond armchair thought: It is, first, to
model the programs proposed in this Article, formally and econometrically. We should
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work to draw a better bead upon likely consequences, and to quantify those to the degree
we are able. I have pointed to what it seems reasonable to expect should we institute
SOP-types and credit-augmenting programs of the kinds I have sketched. And those
expectations do appear reasonable, in light of the ready analogies drawn between what
I’ve proposed, and the successful programs they replicate and adapt. But we can proceed
with more confidence – and draw wider support – if we first “crunch the numbers” and
confirm expectations.
After such modeling, if that indeed proves to lend weight to our expectations, we
should experiment “on the ground:” We should design and try pilot programs. That’s
how the ESOP began and then spread, after all – one troubled firm at a time. And that is
how most programs start and then spread. We might even begin our experimenting for
the benefit of disadvantaged constituencies, or veterans, or both (indeed there is overlap
here), just as we did in the cases of home- and higher education-finance. These
constituencies are those now in most urgent need, and they are the ones to the helping of
whom our less generous compatriots always are least prone to object. We’ve been at war
for a while now. There will be veterans aplenty in need of our help. Should things work
well here, it will be only a matter of time before programs extend to the (now apparently
shrinking) middle classes.
By way of providing yet further encouragement to our further exploring, it bears
emphasis again: We are talking here about potentially society-transformative action that
is primarily nonetheless privately driven. Individuals, firms and financial institutions
will, in a completed American “ownership society,” be doing most of the driving.
Markets will be the primary allocators, as they are now and as our core values prescribe
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that they ought. What “society” will do as a whole – what “we” will do collectively – is
simply to do what we’ve always done best when we’ve acted collectively:
We afford tax incentives to firm-ownership-spreading. We pool and guaranty
against risks for the eventuation of which no one is individually responsible. And we
jump-start markets that individuals alone, owing to rational calculation and reasonable
risk-aversion, dare not or cannot create single-handedly. Such measures, we saw at Parts
II and V.B, are precisely what we have employed to spread ESOPs, and to establish both
the mortgage insurance markets and the mortgage and student-debt secondary markets.
Those latter, again, began as public institutions – and now have proved viable, after the
“jump starting” and consequent proof of viability, as private ones.
If, then, we can but collectively insure, against default, “mortgages” for the
purchase of business capital now like the housing and human capital we already work
publicly to spread, and if we can jump-start those secondary markets in the resultant
“mortgage” debt, and if we can adapt the ESOP to other SOP forms grounded on
patronage forms additional to labor, we will have completed, at long last, our postHomesteading “ownership society.” We will have afforded to everyone who works hard
a complete and contemporary “homestead” fully counterpart to the responsible-freedomconferring homestead of earlier times. And we will thus have enabled private parties
financially to engineer something that all other societies, including our own, thus far have
dreamed of but failed socially to engineer – a real republic of owners.
Sadly, we saw in V.B, it took national crises – first a stock market crash and
depression, then a lengthy and bitter Cold War – to galvanize our modern-day seriousness
about home-spreading and human capital-spreading. It’s to be hoped that it won’t take
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another such crisis – say a sudden unloading by hostile nations of U.S. government debt,
followed by rocketing interest rates and consequent crash – to prompt seriousness about
spreading firm-ownership. It will be well to take ownership of our society before our
debt’s owners decide to disown us.
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